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FN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary Affairs by the Editor
: k1 1
J
Sorting Out Our Sexual Options
One of the oddities of contemporary American life
is the frequency with which sexual issues get entangled
in public policy. The most recent flap occurred when
Secretary of Education William J. Bennett-who has
the habit of plain speaking and who consequently
often finds himself at the center of controversy-took
up the question of sex education in the schools.
Many conservatives maintain skepticism-if not flatout opposition-to teaching sex in the public-school
system. Mr. Bennett (whose own conservatism is neo
rather than paleo and who regularly provides sophisticated and nuanced defenses of traditional values) has
no opposition to these programs as such, but he thinks
too many of them lack an essential moral component.
We can't talk properly about sex without talking about
values, he believes, and too many current sex-education programs do just that. Or, more precisely, they
approach morality in sexual behavior from the
standpoint of "values clarification," without making
any effort to establish and inculcate right values.
The results of such practice, Bennett suggests, are
just about what one might expect. Teenage pregnancy
rates soar, and studies indicate that more than half of
all teens lose their virginity by age seventeen. Mr. Bennett does not argue that a causal relationship exists between the spread of sex education (70 per cent of all
high school students now take such courses) and the
apparent increase in teenage promiscuity, but he does
suggest that the courses currently offered are obviously not doing much to encourage restraint (or even
care) in sexual behavior among minors.
What should be done, the Secretary says, is simple.
Only those sex-education courses that promote moral
values have a place in the curriculum. We need, he argues bluntly, to teach our children to stop fornicating,
and while that is hardly a project that the schools can
take on by themselves, it is one that they have an inescapable role in so long as they see sex instruction as
part of their educational mandate.
The objections to Bennett's views (he put them forward in a speech in January to, appropriately enough,
a National School Boards Association conference on
character building) have been immediate and predictable. Ms. Faye Wattleton, president of the Planned
Parenthood Federation, a group strongly committed to
sex education in the schools, called the Secretary's plea
for teaching abstinence from sex among minors "politically inspired" and said it would provide fodder for
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"the anti-sex-education elements in this country." Ms.
Wattleton further argued that "one of the options that
should be explored in sex-education programs is the
option of saying no to sexual activity with another person. I don't believe that we should preach to our kids
and tell them what they should and should not do.
The proper place for the teaching of that kind of
moral value is the home."
This is a familiar argument. It is for home and
church to teach values. In a pluralistic society, schools
can analyze value choices and help stimulate clear
thinking about them, but they cannot, in any controverted area, advocate one set of values over
another. They must, in that sense, remain "valuefree." Schools can teach the mechanics and consequences of sexual behavior, but they should not presume to teach children how they ought to act in their
sexual lives. Schools cannot "preach"; they can only
"explore options."
It's all very plausible, and all very misguided.
One wonders, in the first place, if people in most regions of America are so lacking a moral consensus on
such matters that a program in their schools that
urged abstinence from pre-marital sex for minors
would be considered controversial or problematic.
How many parents of school-age children are indifferent or neutral on the question of whether their own
children should engage in sexual intercourse? Would
there be any but the most marginal of criticism against
a program that urged unmarried couples under eighteen to abstain from sex?
At the risk of appearing naive, we would suggest
that the great majority of Americans would have no
difficulty with-indeed would applaud-the institution
of a program of sex education that adopted the slogan
of current efforts in drug education: "Just say no. "
(That's not all we want to teach our children about
sex, of course, but it's not an insignificant item either.)
We could be wrong, of course. It may be that there
are large numbers of people out there who would, for
one reason or another, strongly object to such a program and who agree with Ms. Wattleton and others
that teaching prescriptive values in sex is no proper
part of the school's activity. (We have, after all,
enough trouble these days agreeing on prescriptive
rules in grammar, and if people can't find common
ground on dangling modifiers and split infinitives,
perhaps it is excessive to hope that they can agree on
how teenagers should be taught to manage their hormones.)
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But if that is so, then Ms. Wattleton should face up
to the logic of her argument-at least the logic that
most people would draw from it-and acknowledge
the prospect of the dismantling of sex-education programs altogether. What the people at Planned Parenthood appear not to understand is that a very great
many of us object strongly to any program of sex education for our children that operates in a moral vacuum, that dissociates the clinical and descriptive aspects of sex from their necessary moral context.
We want our children provided with a clear and unseifconscious underst,...nding of themselves as sexual
beings, but since we ; now that they will immediately
ponder connections between lessons in the objective
processes and mechanics of sex and their personal sexual natures and longings, we insist that the descriptive
and the prescriptive be considered together. And for
most of us, that means more than an "exploration of
options." Schools that can't do better than that should
simply get out of the business of sex education.
We don't pretend, and neither does Mr. Bennett,
that proper sex education is easy or that it consists
simply in laying down a list of emphatic negatives. Authoritarian moral teaching doesn't work with kids, as
the parent of any modern teenager knows full well.
But it remains our responsibility as adults to set out
for them authoritative moral norms, and to bend every
effort to get them to internalize and adopt them for
themselves.
The cafeteria approach to morality, which tends to
normless relativism, abdicates that responsibility. Children need to be formed in communities of character,
not set off on their own as ethical individualists whose
only rule for moral behavior is that it be personally
"authentic." If the schools can't talk about authoritative moral norms, we can at least insist that they not
indulge in inculcating a personalist morality that
amounts for many of us to a corruption of our children.
Even on practical grounds, the Planned Parenthood
people have things wrong. Their whole approach to
sex education is predicated on the curious assumption
that it is ignorance that lies behind escalating teenage
pregnancy rates, and that it is knowledge that will set
things right. (If you must have sex, do so "responsibly": use prophylactics.) Yet surely this cannot be so.
In twentieth-century America, only a child raised in a
closet could not know by age fourteen how babies are
made and how, if one so desires, the making of babies
can be avoided. This generation of young people is
better informed about sex than any of its predecessors,
yet still rates of teenage pregnancy probe the stratosphere. The problem is not ignorance, but will; we
need norms more than we need knowledge.
4

Yet finally the issue is not about what "works. " It is
about the kind of morality we want our children to
practice, and how best we can find ways to get them
to act in the way we think right. And if we really are
a civilization that is unsure about whether or not we
want our teenagers to have sex, then perhaps the issue
already is lost and there is nothing that the schools, or
anybody else, can do for us .
C:

Of Race and Ideology
Last month the nation commemorated Martin
Luther King, Jr.'s birthday. We couldn't really celebrate it, since we have so little to celebrate in the field
of civil rights. It is difficult to recall any time since the
1950s when race relations have been any worse in
America than they are today .
The situation of much of black America remains unspeakably bleak. A large black middle class has
emerged, but it has left behind a lower and under
class that is farther removed than ever from the promises of the American Dream. Racial discrepancies grow
progressively worse in income, employment, education , crime, welfare, and family stability. The condition
of a substantial part of black urban America can only
be described as desperate.
The message of the statistics is depressing enough
by itself; what moves it to the edge of despair is that
no one seems able to offer persuasive suggestions as to
how the situation can be turned around . Many critics
argue that we lack the will to change. Perhaps so, but
the more likely, and more disheartening, possibility is
that we lack any clear understanding of what it is we
need to do to move things in the right direction.
In recent weeks, incidents of racial hatred and violence have accentuated our massive national failure in
racial comity. Vicious gang attacks on blacks by whites
in Howard Beach and Klan revivals in Forsyth County
appear to mark an atavistic communal regress in simple decency. We struggle to persuade ourselves that
these are atypical outbursts, and they well might be,
but no matter how many blacks and whites march together in counter-demonstrations nor how often we
assure each other that we shall overcome, the parades
seem pointless and the assurances ring hollow.
And all the while racial estrangement increases. A
Time magazine poll reveals that while blacks and whites
agree overwhelmingly on the persistence of racial prejudice in America, they find little common ground as
to causes and cures for our enduring differences.
Two-thirds of whites disagree with the idea that "most
white Americans do not like blacks," but 51 per cent
The Cresset

of blacks think otherwise. (Almost half of both whites
and blacks agree with the proposition that most blacks
don't like whites.)
Nearly 60 per cent of blacks report having been insulted at one time or another because of their race
(though less than half cite specific instances of discrimination in employment, education, or housing).
White people are physically afraid of blacks (far more
so than the reverse situation). Whites by and large believe that blacks have equal opportunities in education
and employment; blacks do not agree. Both races want
the federal government to enforce anti-discrimination
laws, but whites oppose specific minority affirmativeaction goals in employment that blacks support.
The civil-rights establishment lays much of the
blame for black problems and even for incidents of racial violence at the door of the Reagan Administration.
John Jacob, president of the Urban League, says that
"the resurgence of racist feelings and continued illegal
discrimination are fostered by the Administration's refusal to admit that racism may still be a problem."
Roger Wilkins, a senior research fellow at the Institute
for Policy Studies, is more pointed: "Although I can't
say Reagan made kids behave the way they did at
Howard Beach, whites get the message that the leader
of this country, the moral beacon, is saying it's all right
to be racist."
Such rhetoric, in our view, misreads motives and
misstates the problem. Ronald Reagan is not a racist
and, to our knowledge at least, no one in his Administration has denied that racism remains a problem in
America. Nor do we think that the President is indifferent to the plight of black Americans. What appears
to his critics as antipathy or indifference is rather for
the President a matter of ideology.
Mr. Reagan genuinely believes, in this as in other
matters, that the solution to our difficulties lies essentially in the private sector and in personal initiative.
The government's duty, he feels, consists mainly in enforcement of anti-discrimination laws; beyond that,
government intervention will likely make matters
worse, not better. Civil-rights leaders, on the other
hand, continue to believe that private and personal initiatives are not enough, that massive government intervention-in the forms of welfare, job training, aid
to education, school busing, and imposition of affirmative-action quotas-lies at the heart of any hope for
the revival of black America. What separates the Administration from its critics is not racism but an
ideological divide.
We think both parties to this dispute need to check
their ideological assumptions more carefully against
the empirical data than they recently have. Civil-rights
liberals should face up to the failures of many governFebruary, 1987

ment programs; it is not racism that suggests that
large amounts of government money have been spent
to no good purpose or that disquieting patterns of
family decay and welfare dependency have emerged,
it is the evidence. The Administration, for its part,
should recognize that government does have a necessary and positive role to play in many areas, and that
that role does not end simply with enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws. Insistence that all government
programs of aid are counter-productive is a figment of
the ideological imagination, not a conclusion from the
historical record.
A more empirical temper will not by itself of course
resolve all the differences between the Administration
and its critics. Deep disagreements of policy and p'"rinciple will inevitably remain. The President will not
change his mind on school busing or the imposition of
quotas (nor, to be frank, do we think he should) and
civil-rights leaders will no doubt continue to view Administration opposition on these issues as evidence of
bad faith. There is probably no way to bridge that
gap. Moreover, the two parties will continue to disagree fundamentally in their essential view of the welfare state.
But short of ideological capitulation on either side,
there still might remain room for movement. The
President should more vigorously push the Congress
to enact his program of urban enterprise zones: packages of tax breaks and other financial incentives to encourage businesses to build and invest in inner-city
areas. The program is no panacea, but the combination of public and private initiative could do considerable good and it contains within itself elements that
both liberals and conservatives should be able to endorse. Beyond that, the President needs to recognize
that government must do more to provide job training
for the disadvantaged (this again could be done in
concert with the private sector). He is right to stress
that in a private-enterprise economy entrepreneurial
and job skills are essential; he ought to see that a legacy of discrimination among blacks requires a role for
government in developing those skills.
These are very modest proposals, but they at least
are located in the realm of the possible. Distrust and
anger will remain among blacks toward the Administration. No program or set of programs will end that.
But we have to start somewhere. The existing situation, not just between blacks and the government but
between blacks and whites in general, is making Americans ethical strangers to one another. We simply must
do something to change that. The situation is beyond
uplifting rhetoric, but it remains the duty of the President to indicate more than he has that he understands the urgency of the situation.
Cl
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Renu Juneja

OF SABBATICALS, WORK, AND TIME
Reflections on Cultural Marginality

In the corridors of my academe, there is a persistent
rumor abroad that the primitive world is shrinking.
This rumor I suspect to be the work of bored
sociologists, playful historians, or overtaxed political
scientists-and circulated chiefly to unnerve those anthropologists whose identity as princes and professionals within their discipline seems to rest on extended
fieldwork in some underdeveloped hinterland. The
tactic, we may assume, has a positive aim: to liberate
the anthropologists into a wider view of their subject,
a freedom all of us in neighboring disciplines must
equally realize.
But to stay with anthropology for the moment, almost forty years ago Max Gluckman had rebuked
those fellow enquirers in this branch of human knowledge for whom "better a missionary who'd seen an African than a Levy-Bruhl who had not; better an African himself, than a Frazer." And even earlier, Bronislaw Malinowski had forecast: "The anthropology of
the future will be . . . as interested in the Hindu as
in a Tasmanian ... in the West Indian Negro as in
the Melanesian Trobriander, in the detribalized African of Harlem as in the Pygmy of Perak." That future
is in some measure here. Having recognized our own
savageness, some of us now are as interested in the
civilized tribes of a developed world as in the inhabitants of a rain forest.
So it seems not altogether unlikely that some young
anthropologist will choose to stay away from
Malinowski's Trobrianders or E. E. Evans-Pritchard's
Azande and work instead with the less exotic but
equally strange community of the university. Our
academic world is no less a tribe with its own totems

Renu Juneja is currently in the British West Indies on sabbatical leave from Valparaiso University. She is engaged in
the study of West Indian literature. Her most recent contribution to The Cresset, "Beyond Gender and Race: The Celebration of Difference," appeared last October.
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and divination, its hierarchies and kinship relations. As
in any other cultural sub-system, we are a group of individuals interacting according to patterns of learned
behavior. Our roles are well defined, our status ascriptions, political structures, and internal relationships
equally capable of explanation in terms of trade, economic arrangements, or inheritance of strategic resources.
The sorts of questions that preoccupy cultural anthropologists--questions about national or tribal character, socialization, basic personality structures, and
values-seem equally applicable here. Indeed, prevalent stereotypes about absent-minded, socially (and
sexually) permissive, politically liberal professors are
conceptually similar to declarations about national
temperament whereby the French are deemed logical,
the British reserved, and the Americans obsessively
congenial.
Also like any other community, academia has its
own rituals. It is one such ritual, the sabbatical, or
rather a crisis induced by this ritual, that has become,
for me, the starting point of these reflections. Lest my
credentials be questioned, let me confess at the outset
that I am not the young anthropologist I envisioned
earlier as the most likely undertaker of this quest. A
middle-aged and, up to this point, largely uncritical inhabitant of this sub-system of the universe, the most
validity I may claim is that of an inside informant. If,
as Malinowski urged, "the final goal, of which an
Ethnographer should never lose sight ... is briefly, to
grasp the native's point of view, his relations to life, to
realize his vision of the world," then the native-turnedethnographer may be peculiarly privileged.
And handicapped as well. Evans-Pritchard concluded that the "social anthropologist discovers in a
native society what no native can explain to him and
what no layman, however conversant with the culture,
can perceive-its basic structure." This warning against
native and lay ethnographers presumably addresses
the need for special training and necessary distance
from which stem the abilities to abstract and to comThe Cresset
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pare. A different discipline could conceivably provide
similar training.
As a student of Renaissance culture and literature,
I have pursued comparable aims-essentially to understand significant features of a different culture and to
articulate these differences in terms of the present culture. The evidence is, of course, indirect, consisting of
documents and artifacts, but the methodology not dissimilar. All vital and valid literary interpretation, when
historically oriented, seeks to abstract, much like anthropology, a coherent and integrated system of values
and themes, to uncover the latent, underlying cultural
forms now embodied in a particular document. Despite the efforts of some social anthropologists to ally
themselves unreservedly with the natural sciences, thus
claiming to promulgate laws and not patterns, the discipline remains essentially a member of the human sciences. And the rest of us in the humanities remain
equally committed interpreters of value systems inherent in a particular culture.
While all historical studies, explicitly or implictly, involve comparisons with the culture of a different time
or people, they do not, necessarily, hone the ability to
unmask assumptions or identify paradoxes within
one's own culture. A cross-cultural experience, it
would seem, is almost a prerequisite for an ethnographic study of one's own culture. That certainly has
been the case with me. My bemused response to my
behavior during my sabbatical (almost as if I were observing a stranger) stems from an uneasy, but not, as
I will argue later, unhappy confluence of two very different value systems--one acquired during the last
twenty years or so and one inherited through birth
and childhood in a culture very dissimilar from the
present. That is, while half a lifetime spent in residence at American universities makes me feel so acculturated to this microcosm of American culture that I
feel and act like a native, that other half lived ten
thousand miles away makes me step out of my skin, as
it were, and probe the assumptions underlying these
feelings and actions. An enterprise not unlike being
both the psychiatrist and the patient.
For this sabbatical, I had waited long and prepared
carefully. A half-year sabbatical together with a generous grant from a private foundation has "liberated"
me from teaching for a year. The project involves extensive interdisciplinary reading about the British West
Indies followed by a long stay in the islands to flesh
theory with experience and to study West Indian literature. An enviable position no doubt, especially as it
promises escape from a midwestern winter.
Yet, despite the steady, eclectic, and enlarging reading, I am restless, uncomfortable, and nagged by a residual guilt: this is not really "work" nor "productive."
February, 1987

Why should the always-craved-for freedom to read
widely, for the sheer joy of reading and learning, now
appear like sinful luxury? Had we not, while suffering
the arduous regimen of graduate school, looked forward to a future beyond specialized classes, senseless
requirements, and narrow research topics? Demands
of teaching and the pressure to publish may have delayed the promised future but not dimmed the desire.
Why, then, should the fulfillment of a cherished
dream so fail to fulfill? Obviously, those past expectations and goals are no longer in harmony with norms
of behavior acquired in subsequent years. The issue,
then, is more fundamental: What conceptions and attitudes prompt the present response? Or, as I have repeatedly asked myself, what notions of sabbaticals,
work, and time (wasted or used productively) now inhabit my psyche?

The sabbatical leave is a ritual
peculiar to the university culture,
more specifically to the American
university community. Derived from
the word "sabbath," the term may carry
associations of rest after long labor.
The sabbatical leave is a ritual peculiar to the university culture, more specifically to the American university community. Derived from the word "sabbath,"
the term may carry, but only for those outside the
province of the university culture, associations of rest
after prolonged labor. Certainly, for the ancient Jews,
the sabbatical year, observed every seventh year, was
initially a year during which land remained fallow. All
dictionary explanations of the term remain mildly constrained by this notion of respite, usually defining the
sabbatical as a year of absence granted every seventh
year for travel, research, or rest.
Yet no present-day university dean is likely to approve a sabbatical application pleading need for rest,
however dire the need for such rejuvenation; nor any
college professor foolish enough to openly admit that
the sabbatical will be used for fallow floundering, however creative this floundering. Indeed, it would be a
mistake to think that in some golden past sabbaticals
were either granted or were even meant to be granted
for rest. This peculiarly American ritual, related to a
distinctively American notion of a university, from its
very inception has been a tool to promote "productive"
research, that is, research leading to publication.
The inception of the sabbatical towards the end of
the nineteenth century was clearly linked with a grow-
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ing emphasis away from teaching to research and publication within the American university system. As Frederick Rudolph remarks in his history of The American
College and University, "In return for these months of
relief from university duties, the professors knew what
was expected and were indeed happy to oblige: a fresh
batch of articles, a startling new laboratory discovery,
a book in the university's series of scholarly studies."
This new academic person, very distinct from the
preacher-teacher of the past, was most emphatically a
professional, and the new emphasis on professionalism
in itself a distinctively American phenomenon.
Thus, whereas British higher education, even at the
beginning of this century, tended to be somewhat nonacademic, the privilege of the upper-class elite, American higher education came to be more professional in
its aims. Sir Charles Morris records his surprise at first
visiting the University of Michigan some sixty years
ago: "I was greatly taken aback with what seemed to
me to be an overwhelming preponderance of professional schools in the University." At Oxford he had assumed that the university was concerned with "education" and not professional training. For Charles Gillispie, Oxford at the end of the nineteenth century
"seems to have been .. . almost a way of life if not a
State of Grace, and an education there was not only a
training of the mind, but a social, a moral, a British,
even a spiritual experience."
American professors, then, are not aristocrats of
spirit engaged in a quasi-spiritual pursuit of knowledge, for while something of this dedicated spirit survives among us, most of us are, primarily, professionals pursuing a career and not a calling. Hence the
badges of professionalism--certifications, ranks, memberships in scholarly organizations--carry great
weight. Of course, American influence has now transformed university education over much of the world.
The Oxford of today is no longer the Oxford of Morns.
Even th~ slow-changing outposts of the British Empire have begun to succumb to American visions of a
modern university. When I left my teaching job at the
University of Delhi, India, a new rule had just been established: All newly hired university lecturers were to
acquire a Ph.D. within the first five years of hiring.
The old style masters, gurus revered for their wisdom
acquired through years of teaching envisioned as a
kind of spiritual discipline, had begun to be eclipsed
by the new stars whose prestige had been garnered
through conferences and institutes.
And while better prepared than Morris for my introduction to the American university system, I, too,
remember my initial surprise at another peculiarly
American institution-the commencement ritual with
its parade of professors in academic robes. Even today,
8

I suffer from acute self-consciousness when participating in the ritual. My colleagues at Valparaiso who
have hitherto, I am sure, ascribed my inability to enjoy
the hoopla of commencement i:o iconoclastic and rebellious tendencies may now be surprised to learn that
my difficulties are really rooted in the survival within
me of a different tradition, rather than a dislike for
tradition.
And the ritual itself is not only uniquely American,
it is also distinctively American. It became prominent
at the same time as the sabbatical and for the same
reasons. Rudolph writes: "The exhibition of professors
displayed in academic robes not only tied the new
academicians into an ancient tradition of learning, but
it also paraded them like so many cadets in uniform ...
the commencement ritual which had well served the
varied purposes of the American college now assumed
a new purpose: the exhibition of new professionals,
drawn up in order of rank and wearing their badges
of merit."

American professors are not
aristocrats of spirit engaged in a
quasi-spiritual pursuit of knowledge,
for while something of this dedicated
spirit survives among us, most of us
are, primarily, professionals
pursuing a career and not a calling.
University teaching as a career is now infused with
a notion of professional life as ascending stages of
competence and reward. In fact, the changing sense of
the word "career" itself reveals the powerful influence
of American values, and the present meaning of the
word is as different from its root as the sabbatical is
from the sabbath. The root of the word "career" lies
in "to carry," so that the original definitions of the
word referred to motion or continuing action. The
early-nineteenth-century
American
edition
of
Johnson's eighteenth-century Dictionary of the English
Language offers the following list: the ground on
which a race is run; course of action.
By the end of the nineteenth century, however,
"career" had acquired a distinctly modern and American meaning. In the Funk and Wagnalls of 1893,
career is defined as "a course of business activity or
enterprise; especially a course of professional life or
employment that offers advancement and honor." It is
this pursuit of honor (which, of course, brings advancement) that compels the American scholar to publish, because nothing brings more recognition in one's
field than an impressive list of scholarly publications.
The Cresset
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So much so that reputation in one's profession becomes more important than loyalty to a particular institution. Hence, too, the notorious mobility of American professors, so unlike their counterparts in Europe
and Asia.
American universities raid each other to promote
their reputations by enticing highly reputed-that is,
highly published-scholars. As Kenneth D. Benne, a
critic of American universities, laments: "The professor invests his talents in negotiable wares-publications
and other more or less quantifiable evidence of contributions to his field-which can be easily transferred
to other employment situations and are widely and
easily negotiable throughout the academic market
place-much as the sojourner in a hostile country
often converts his assets from real estate into jewels in
order to facilitate a quick get away across the border."
The enticements, predictably, are not just higher rank
and greater salary, but longer sabbaticals, lesser teaching loads, and greater opportunity for research and
publication.
Productivity, marketability, mobility-we have begun
to uncover the value system that influences norms of
behavior within our community. This is essentially the
same value system that had so disturbed William
James after his experience of German universities. "I
have been growing lately to feel," wrote James, "that
a great mistake of my past life-which has been prejudicial to my education .. . is an impatience of results . . .. We Americans are too greedy for results."
Work is not work unless it produces results; a sabbatical is not a sabbatical unless it produces publication.
The worth of leisurely reading, fostering a slow
maturing but qualitative transformation of a mind, is
both unmeasurable and intangible; quantitative results
like articles are tangible and easier to measure. Is it
any wonder, then, that I am nagged by the fear that
my present sabbatical has been unproductive?
II

Since a cultural system is sui generis, everything that
happens within the system must be explained by aspects within the system. The work of an interpreter of
culture must involve not only identifying important
concepts but also determining their context-that is,
how the particular concepts are related to other concepts.
Notions of productivity within American culture and
the subculture of the university are closely related to
notions of time, time well used or wasted. The sabbatical is, after all, time taken off from teaching for research and not rest. American society is driven by an
urgency to use time efficiently. Time moves forward
in a linear dimension; the present is forever eclipsed
February, 1987

by the future and what becomes the past is lost
forever. No other people work so hard at "making the
best of their time," so that even time taken off from
work as vacation is consumed in the strenuous activity
of having a good time. I have seen families come
home from vacation trips more tired than when they
left.
Then, too, time is a commodity which like other
commodities can be bought and sold. Time, as my
friends are fond of telling me, is money. We are a
people propelled into motion by clocks and calendars
so that punctuality becomes a measure of our civility
and an unpunctual person is morally suspect.
My own experience between two cultures has reinforced my appreciation of the culture specificity of
such values. During visits of family and friends from
India, my now somewhat Western response to time
suddenly begins to appear slightly demented, mildly
manic, and senselessly unproductive. For Indians inhabit a very different universe, where history is circular and not linear. The cosmos is settled and not
changing, and individual achievement of little significance within the larger fabric of the total community.

Notions of productivity within
American culture and the subculture
of the university are closely related
to notions of time, time well used
or wasted. The sabbatical is, after
all, time taken off from teaching
for research and not for rest.
Timebound events and happenings are shorn of
weight when time itself is seen as a play of shadows
within the stable whole of creation. Instead of seeking
to change the world, the Indian wise soul practices deliberate inaction. To retreat from time is of greater
merit than to chase time. It is foolish to believe in the
efficacy of timebound action because one cannot intend the real significance of one's act. Knowledge, for
Indians, is that higher understanding which lifts one
from the necessity of action.
Thus, while teaching Hamlet to my more traditional
students in India, I found them largely unsympathetic
to Hamlet's anxiety about his inaction, although they
were willing to concede that his inability not to act dispassionately could be a flaw. To swiftly execute the
command of the ghost would be a fitting demonstration of kshatriya dharma (warrior ethic). As a prince,
Hamlet must follow the codes of behavior laid down
for his station. For my Indian students, the validity of

9

the ghost was never in question and the "mousetrap"
(the play within the play to catch the conscience of the
king) an unnecessary piece of cleverness.
And if Hamlet had really been trained in philosophy
at Wittenberg, and consequently felt more at home in
the Brahminical pursuit of truth, he should have returned to Wittenberg and let Denmark fend for itself.
Time would take care of that demon Claudius, and
willy-nilly, the error be dissipated and the universe restored to its original order. Aristotle's dictum that
"character is destiny" failed to impress minds bred on
Indian classical tales where plot complications tend to
be somewhat arbitrary protractions of error and where
resolutions are achieved by equally arbitrary lifting of
error, or curse, or unreality.
This contrast in attitudes to work and time is even
clearer in Indian creation myths, those tales of the
past we use to justify our present values. Predictably,
there are several such stories where sometimes the
universe is created in playful activity of the Divine, is
sometimes the product of relational activity between
several gods, and is sometimes even an accident. All
these versions lack the sense of creation as the purposive work of Yahweh (so strenuous as to require rest)
or as a sequential march of time which forever
changes reality. The following excerpt from the
Mahabharata (one of the two primary religious epics of
India) is a case in point. Lord Krishna, himself an incarnation of Lord Vishnu, the supreme creator, speaks
of the Lord's creation:
The moonlight is your smile. Earth and sky are your
illusion.
At the end of Time, first comes drought, then the
seven suns that bring fire and leave Earth hushed in
death and deep in ashes, overhung by burning colored
clouds.
Then the lightning breaks and the water falls.
Drowned are the sun and the moon, and the Earth and
stars. You swallow the winds and float sleeping on the
dark waters, resting on Shesha [the great coiled snake
on which Vishnu reposes] the thousand-hooded serpent
white as pearls.
Then you awake, and like a winking firefly at night
during the rains, you dart over the water, seeking
Earth. You dive and bring her back as before, and place
her on Shesha as before, and create all beings as before.
And after Time has begun again, when Shesha
yawns, quaking the earth . . .
And so the cycle continues. Time is obliterated and
recreated, like a mere wink of God. Significantly, inHindi the same word (kal) suffices both for yesterday
and tomorrow. However, because relationships matter
much more than the individual (or a single person's
work and time), all Indian languages have very precise
terms for various family relationships. Instead of
generic terms like grandfather, grandmother, uncle,
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aunt, nephew, and mece, Indians distinguish very
carefully between maternal and paternal relations as
well as seniority within these relationships. Thus, there
are different terms for mother's father and father's
father, for grandson derived from daughter or from
son. There is a different term for an aunt who is your
mother's sister as against an aunt who is your father's
sister or your father's elder brother's wife and your
father's younger brother's wife. And so on.
The terms we invent indicate how we construe our
world of experience. One such term-"Indian Standard Time"-is a recent invention of Indians who have
been forced or chosen to step into the western stream
of time. It records our rueful recognition that time for
Indians moves at a different pace than for westerners.
However well adapted we may be in our professional
life to the urgency of time, socially many of us are
likely to relapse into careless unpunctuality. Invitations
for supper at seven will bring guests strolling in, without apology, at nine. Having suffered occasional embarrassment from being too early-my family
complains that I have become too American-! have
now learned to inquire from my hosts if the invitation
is really for the time indicated or if it must be decoded
into Indian Standard Time.
Foreign visitors to India, unacquainted with its
values, are often exasperated at this slow-moving
world where efforts to change direction are so easily
defeated, where nothing ever seems to get done, and
where time is so willfully wasted. A sympathetic western friend visiting India once confided his inability to
resolve the paradox of this people so warm, engaging,
and deeply concerned for events, yet so unable to influence events.
My husband, a "detribalized" African from Brooklyn
and an Africologist suspicious of potentially racist
terms like tribes and natives, reports similar western
responses to idle Africans who waste time and who are
always late. Here, too, a different concept of time informs behavior. Whereas the goal-oriented westerner
looks to the future, the traditional African looks toward a long past and is seldom preoccupied with the
remote future. As John Mbiti writes in African Religions
and Philosophies, "What has not taken place or what has
no likelihood of an immediate occurance falls in the
category of 'no time.' "
The center of gravity for human thought is the past
(Zamani in Swahili) towards which the present (Sasa)
moves. People attend less to what is to happen and
more to what has happened. In East African languages there are no terms for the distant future, and
while there are several African myths about Zamani,
there are no myths of the world to come, of history
progressing to a future climax. The present disappears
into the past and the history of each individual life is
The Cresset

a similar backward movement. As people get older
they move gradually from Sasa to Zamani. Their death,
too, is a gradual process moving them from Sasa to Zamani, for even after their physical death people continue to exist for a while in the present-as long as
they are remembered by name by relatives and
friends. For the traditional African, immortality is not
achieved by works lasting into the future beyond death
but through the memory of the community within
which one has lived one's life. Kinship and relationship are consequently far more significant than individual achievement.
III

No traditional Indian or African, then, is likely to
sympathize with my anxieties about an unproductive
sabbatical. That the anxiety persists despite my efforts
to abstract and assign cultural causes is in itself an
index of my acculturation into the American academic
community. On one level, my experience reinforces
beliefs in the determining and influencing power of
culture. We are deeply molded by our culture, almost
unconsciously internalizing norms and values of social
groups within which we exist.
On another level, it affirms the human ability to
transcend or alter ingrained value systems. HGwever
primary the psychological and social experiences of
childhood, humans are not puppets of this experience.
Talcott Parsons may be right in asserting that the most
enduring and major value patterns are laid down in
childhood, but we need some mechanisms to explain
an individual's or a society's capacity to disregard these
blueprints and alter conduct or direction. We also
need to recognize that even a social group with a common value orientation may contain within itself some
deviant and opposing tendencies. Generalizations
about national character or cultural values remain partially true stereotypes, not universally applicable classifications. The hard-working Americans actively consuming time are also the passive truants from time
when absorbed for hours in front of the television
screen.
Anthropologists who worry about the shrinking
primitive world must also worry about the loss of cultural homogeneity characteristic of more traditional,
isolated societies. For such nostalgic cherishers of cultural concordance, to live simultaneously in more than
one culture must necessarily be a discordant experience. Thus, Claude Levi-Strauss laments the disappearance of the ideal savage and Margaret Mead fears
that experience of a heterogeneous culture may drive
people into "more and more special forms of
February, 1987

psychosomatic expression."
Yet for some of us, the loss of homogeneity is not
necessarily a loss of harmony because we can envisage
the possibility of creating, consciously willing, new harmonies. Culturally plural societies like the United
States (at least in potential if not in practice) and the
West Indies foster the ability to free oneself from bondage to one set of values. To straddle more than one
culture may be a mildly schizophrenic experience, but
it also liberates the skepticism necessary to hone interpretive and analytical abilities. It can induce that
healthy confrontation between different values which
becomes the source of our willingness to test unquestioned assumptions. It can transform cultural automatons into humans who take charge of their destiny, as
I have taken charge of my compulsion to be productive during my sabbatical by writing this essay-a
catharsis that will liberate me from my compulsion so
that I may now be free to continue my non-productive
reading.
~~

Anonymous Groundsman,
old,
loose-bodied man, hard hand lost
in a mop of weeds, lays the hoe
deft as a rein on the ground,
biting out roots. Wordless.
Looks up at the sun; down
through his sun-grimace at me;
no greeting. Bends to the
bed. Beneath the buildings,
bends small. In thirty years
may one look at me and get
no words back; my own name
be others' word for hoe-worked
ground, impersonal intention,
love whose body is
the dirt bed mutely clean.

Lionel Basney
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Jill Baumgaertner

METAPHOR, STORY,
AND THE CHRISTIAN WRITER
On the Relationship between Faith and literature

One of the courses I teach is a basic creative-writing
course in which the students spend a semester attempting to capture and reorder the image, metaphor,
and story-making facilities which were so keen when
they were children. Some, who are still in touch with
the playful, childlike parts of their personalities, are
able from the beginning to write small masterpieces in
which image informs character and character experiences conflict, in which plot seems to emerge naturally
and beautifully from the actions of the characters.
The definition of story I offer my students is the
classic one: a narrative about a person who wants
something, meets obstacles, and then fails, succeeds, or
meets a stalemate. In the process the character may
experience enlightenment or transformation or both.
At any rate the language used to define "story" is infused with a religious resonance which makes teaching
narrative writing particularly rewarding-and particularly challenging- in the Christian college.
Students who have been exposed to the gospel know
instinctively what transformation means. They understand the thin line between tragedy and comedy. They
understand how the bleakest Good Friday changes, finally, into Easter morning. They bring with them a
knowledge of story from their scriptural studies and
this enriches their own efforts immeasurably. But
often they do not understand that the meaning must
be in the characters themselves. It is the rare author
who imposes meaning artificially and still has an integrated narrative.
It is difficult in good fiction to separate plot and
character, which are mutually dependent elements.

Jill Baumgaertner, who teaches English at Wheaton College, writes regularly on modern literature for The Cresset
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The best writers insist that one never begins with plot,
but rather, that the plot is derived from characterization. Much bad fiction (pulp romance, Christian romance, mysteries, and pot-boilers of all shapes), however, works conversely, manipulating characters inside
the plots. This sort of literature may simply be a poor
and ineffective extension of the types of characterization that worked well in the oral tradition, which Walter Ong sees as different from that which has arisen
with the written word.
Characters developed in the oral tradition, he contends, are usually always flat character types, whereas
"written word" characters are more likely to be full
and "rounded." "Writing and reading ... are solo activities . . . . They engage the psyche in strenuous, interiorized, individualized thought of a sort inaccessible
to oral folk. In the private worlds that they generate,
the feeling for the 'round' human character is borndeeply interiorized in motivation, powered mysteriously, but consistently, from within."' These private
worlds and the strong mythic impulse are what make
story so compelling and the study of fiction so necessary.
Flannery O'Connor's advice to her friend provides
strong support for my teaching. "You would probably
do just as well to get that plot business out of your
head and start simply with a character or anything
that you can make come alive. When you have a character he will create his own situation and his situation
will suggest some kind of resolution as you get into it.
Wouldn't it be better for you to discover a meaning in
what you write than to impose one? Nothing you write
will lack meaning because the meaning is in you." 2
Those students who manipulate their characters to fit
'Walter J. Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologiz.ing of
the Word (London and New York: Methuen, 1982), p. 153.
2
Flannery O'Connor, The Habit of Being, ed., Sally Fitzgerald (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1979), p. 188.
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a preconceived Christian "formula" are actually the
ones who feel the most insecure about the relationship
between art and faith.
These are students who feel that maybe the meaning is not in them-or if it is in them, maybe it won't
appear in their writing. They doubt the power of their
faith to inform all of their actions-both conscious and
unconscious-and they do not yet understand Sally
TeSelle's contention that in scripture "we are never
given a theology of the kingdom (though theologies of
the kingdom have been abstracted from the New Testament), but we are told stories about it, about people
who want the kingdom and why they want it; we are
shown metaphors-pearls, seeds, camels and needles,
children, hungry and thirsty strangers, maidens and a
bridegroom, and so on-which image it forth." 3 The
image, the character, the metaphor, the story itself will
contain, without abstraction, the theology.
This is a truth that itself is best taught through the
use of story, so to counter the fear that they are not
being evangelistic enough in their writing, I tell my
students a story about one of my poems. (See Appendix A.) One spring afternoon I returned home to discover my neighbor cutting down the apple tree in his
backyard. That morning the tree, at the height of its
blooming, had triggered memories and associations for
me. All day I had been jotting images connected with
other times and places in my life, but the poem those
images wanted to become stopped as abruptly as the
tree's final fall. I asked my neighbor (who was, by the
way, no harsh anti-romantic, but a fine, fair-spirited
lover of nature) why he was overseeing what I could
only conclude was the desecration of springtime. He
smiled and said something about his baby being due
soon and the tree being such a mess in the fall.
In a flash I realized what was really occurring. His
was a long-awaited baby, and as far-fetched as it might
have seemed, I realized that he was actually afraid of
apples falling on the baby's head. Amused-and also
touched-! knew that I had a poem and I soon began
it as a humorous piece, but it rapidly evolved into
something entirely different.
A few weeks after writing the poem I was invited to
speak on the subject of the Christian writer. A point
I wanted to make was that the Christian writer must
realize that blatant "Christian" content may be a sign
of righteousness, but does not necessarily produce art.
I planned to use my most recent poem, "No Apples in
this Garden, Sir" to show that the poet's first concern
is to capture experience through images.
For the first time, in preparation for that lecture, I
'Sally McFague TeSelle, Speaking in Parables (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1975), p. 40.
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read the poem as a critic, and I was surprised at what
I found: the apple tree in the garden, the fall of apples linked with the fall of man, and the child who "is
and will be, but/hardly ever was," made in the image
of the Father, but without his infinite nature. I found
in this nativity poem echoes of the medieval cherry
carol, the stain of sin plastered to the shingles, the
bruise of original sin, Christmas celebration, Easter resurrection, and Pentecostal flame. In short, I discov- .
ered the meaning of the poem long after I had actually written it-and I believe I also discovered something about creativity and the Christian writer.

For the first time, in preparation
for that lecture, I read my poem as a
critic; what I found surprised me.
What impelled me to write the poem in the first
place? Something in the image of that apple tree provoked a response. I was not consciously aware that I
was responding to scriptural image and to archetype.
I was not conscious that I was writing about a father
trying to protect his baby from the effects of the Fall.
In fact, if I had been aware of these roots, the result
would have been labored and self-consciously symbolic. But because scriptural image is important to me,
because it evidently is a part of my conscious and subconscious mind, the picture of my neighbor's tree appealed to me and I knew I had to copy it down.
"Copie only that, and save expense," George Herbert
says. But, importantly, I did not set out to write a
"Christian" poem. I set out to represent the truth of
an image and, in so doing, I also wrote a poem with
Christian resonance.
In teaching poetry or fiction writing the first obstacle I must help the student overcome is the tendency
to fight images for "meaning" and "significance." Such
premature "interpretation" on the part of the writer is
something like trying to interpret a dream as one
dreams. The result is the death of the dream, or the
paralysis of the poetic faculty. Therefore, many of the
exercises in a poetry-writing or fiction-writing class encourage the student to relax into memory, to trail
through memory, to free specific images so that they
can flow one into another. When a student is able to
call forth these images faster than he can write them
down, the magic of the creative act has begun.
Creativity is not chaotic, mad, and formless, although the results of these class exercises may suggest
that at first. But an order, a reason, or a unifying
thread appears as soon· as the student is able to step
back and analyze his jottings. Often a student will not
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realize exactly what it is he has created until long after
he has finished. He will have been more concerned
with accurately describing his memory, a situation, or
an image than with pushing "meaning" at a reader.
I tell another story to my poetry-writing students-a
story which is also about the mind's remarkable creative functions. A matter of some controversy in the
past decade's arguments within the Lutheran ChurchMissouri Synod was the definition of the "Word" of
God. Some wanted to define the phrase to refer only
to the written scriptures. Others felt that the Word referred primarily to Christ Himself, and that to elevate
the scriptures to equal stature with Christ would be a
form of idolatry. The whole matter made me think
about the meaning of "words." What are they anyway
but collections of syllables, positions of lips, tongue
against teeth-all of this for sounds which convey
meaning, sounds which name.

One day, in a usual attempt to scare
up a poem, I began to write a random
list of images: aluminum bucket,
geranium petals, furniture glue,
violin strings. They seemed unrelated.
One day, in a usual attempt to scare up a poem, I
began to write a random list of images: aluminum
bucket, geranium petals, furniture glue, violin strings.
They seemed at first glance to be entirely unrelated.
I wondered why these words, this conglomeration of
disparate elements, occurred to me at all. I did not
even own an aluminum bucket, but I had in my mind
a clear picture of a specific aluminum bucket. I knew
its coolness. I could feel the groove the handle would
make in my hand. I could hear it clang against my cement basement floor. I could even smell its hardware
store, nails-and-rubber-hoses smell. As for geranium
petals, I remembered them scattered across the floor
late that fall after I had tried to save my outdoor
plants in indoor pots. Furniture glue-I saw the large
bottle of it ready for the annual wintering of all my
antique chairs.
My imagination, I began to realize, had enfleshed
the words. Any word I put on that list would have its
own context, its own reason for being there. I could
not divorce myself or my words from meaning. I
thought again of aluminum buckets. The image could
not have just popped into my head autonomous,
metallic, arbitrary-and then I remembered.
That autumn someone somewhere had mentioned
aluminum buckets and the image appealed to me. I
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did not want to forget the reality of that flash of
metal, so I wrote it down fast before it fled. It was
ready, then, to be plucked out of my mind when I
needed a word or two for an eclectic list of common
things. The writing of the image was a kind of naming
for me. It made the image my own.
I was certainly not writing a poem when I wrote the
list of words, but my involvement in poetry revealed
itself unintentionally. Both "aluminum bucket" and
"geranium petal" have six syllables; the adjectives
share a common "-urn" syllable; the phrases possess a
common "-et" sound and the beginning "b" and "p" in
the nouns. These images, in short, provide satisfying
echoes of each other, but I did not laboriously consider these similarities when I wrote the list. The
words happened, and as my mind created a list of
common words, my pen recorded what my senses
selected as the most interesting.
So what does this mean? It means that words are
forms and types of that other Word. It means that
even when writing a simple word list, a business letter,
a committee report, a book review, a scholarly article,
a novel, a poem, the writer thinks selectively, specifically, sensuously, imaginatively. Christ is there, too,
specific and personal, possessing sense as we do, experiencing the concreteness of death, as we shall.
Through his specific, historical act, He opened the
eternal, the abstract, to all of us.
Poetry is word-small w-an echo of the Wordcapital W-from the first chapter of John-and poetry
through juxtaposition makes the common uncommon
and the ordinary extraordinary. Frederick Buechner
writes that
John was a poet, and he knew about words. He knew
that all men and all women are mysteries known only
to themselves until they speak a word that opens up the
mystery. He knew that the words people speak have
their life in them just as surely as they have their breath
in them. He knew that the words people speak have
dynamite in them and that a word may be all it takes
to set somebody's heart on fire or break it in two. He
knew that words break silence and that the word that
is spoken is the word that is heard and may even be
answered . And at the beginning of his gospel he wrote
a poem about the Word that God spoke.•
My story of the random list of words continues and
leads, finally, to where it actually began-a poem. (See
Appendix B.) The last image on that list was violin
strings, which had come to mind because I had just
finished a poem about my daughter and a violin shop
and the experience of restringing a violin. As always,
•Frederick Buechner, Peculiar Treasures (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1979), p. 72.
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I was surprised to find out what I really meant when
I wrote the poem, for later when I examined it carefully, I saw that it was also a poem about harmonyuniversal harmony. It was connected with an image I
have found immensely appealing, one which I discovered when writing my dissertation. In a Renaissance
woodcut, the universe is pictured as a huge lute.
Christ is stretched across it, hanging in agony on the
cross of the lute. God's hand reaches down to tune the
universe by turning the pegs.
When I wrote the poem "Eine Kleine," I was writing
about the experience of buying new strings for my
daughter's violin. That was all. The poem was concrete, literal, specific. But because I am who I am-a
child of the original Creator Who is Who He is-1
cannot avoid reflecting Him in all I do. Because of
Him my daughter's violin is infused with the grandeur
of God. My word has become Worded.
Fiction and poetry are incarnational arts, then, for
they use the concrete, the immediate, the visible, the
outer, the word, to approach the invisible, the
spiritual, the inner, the abstract. God is what I, as a
gentile, could once see only as distant and removed.
With Christ, God becomes historical, concrete, immediate. And my poetry? My poetry is myself distilled.
My poetry is stronger than I am, just as in my best
moments, the times when I am closest to God, I am
also more than I am.
O'Conner speaks of three problematic ways of living
in the modern world and in her categories are the answers to my students' next question: What happens
when the meaning simply is not in the author? 5 This,
as I have already indicated, is the fear many students
expose when they plaster the Christian message on top
of their work. The first type of modern mind, according to O'Connor, is one for whom human endeavor is
the ultimate. This mind acknowledges no creator outside the human psyche.
The world of literature is littered with such individuals. One contemporary writer, who has a great following among many students, is John Irving (The
World According to Carp, The Hotel New Hampshire, etc.).
This writer has a phenomenal imagination, but at the
heart of his circus of characters and events is nothing
substantial to hold it all together. His method is to
create unusual settings, weird yet breath-taking juxtapositions, and to pile more and more upon his characters until they completely outdo themselves. Finally,
after the impressive gymnastics, Irving reveals only intellectual shallowness and one begins to suspect his

motives. He exaggerates his characters until the readers cringe-and I suspect that while we are cringing,
he is laughing. His novels are intriguing but uncomfortable experiences. When we reach the final pages,
we are not laughing, but we are not taking him seriously either.
Another contemporary writer who fits into this category is Ann Beattie, whose fiction is almost technically perfect, but whose characters are primarily consumers of all the material comforts, of each other, and
finally of themselves. It is one thing for an author to
write of characters who live in this kind of world. It
is quite another for an author to embrace it herself
and to never get beyond the limitations of her characters.
The second type of modern mind O'Connor mentions is one who believes in a divine being, but does
not recognize this God's involvement in our lives. This
God is so far away and so weak that the believer can
never really reach him; nor does this God seem to be
interested in reaching us. John Updike, for example,
creates a character who finds churches and churchwork irresistible, but he still is not sure about how God
fits into all of it: "He saw nothing about his body
worth resurrecting. God, concretely considered, had a
way of merging with that corner of the church ceiling
that showed signs of water leakage." He stands in the
middle of an empty church one evening when he is
the only one to show up for a committee meeting and
realizes that the reason he keeps coming is "to share
the pride of this ancient thing that will not quite
die .... "6 Updike's strongest characters are almost always God-haunted, but they rarely, if ever, feel God's
immediate presence in their lives.
O'Connor identifies a third type of modern thinking
in the person who can neither believe nor disbelieve,
but who searches desperately for a God who would respond, who would break through. Anne Sexton's The
Awful Rowing Toward God expresses this modern dilemma. In "The Poet of Ignorance" she speculates:

'Flannery O'Connor, "Novelist and Believer," Mystery and
Manners (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1961),
p. 159.
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Perhaps the earth is floating,
I do not know.
Perhaps the stars are little paper cutups
made by some giant scissors,
I do not know.
Perhaps God is only a deep voice
heard by the deaf,
I do not know.
She describes a crab which is attached to her heart and

John Updike, "The Deacon," Museums and Women and
Other Stories (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971.), pp. 43,
48.
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she concludes the poem with these lines:
I had a dream once,
perhaps it was a dream,
that the crab was my ignorance of God.
But who am I to believe in dreams? 7
Humankind's inability to know for sure and God's inability to communicate with us attach themselves to the
particularly sinister figure of the crab: cancer, with all
its disease-laden connotations.
Of the beat poets of the 1950s and '60s Lawrence
Ferlinghetti is perhaps the most outspoken when it
comes to this feeling of distance from God.
I am waiting for the Second Coming
and I am waiting
for a religious revival
to sweep thru the state of Arizona
and I am waiting
for the Grapes of Wrath to be stored
and I am waiting
for them to prove
that God is really American
and I am seriously waiting
for Billy Graham and Elvis Presley
to exchange roles seriously
and I am waiting
to see God on television
piped into church altars
if only they can find
the right channel
to tune in on
and I am waiting
for the Last Supper to be served again
with a strange new appetizer
and I am perpetually awaiting
a rebirth of wonder"
The boredom, the yearning, the paralysis in this poem
appear often in twentieth-century poetry, but Ferlinghetti employs a baser kind of cynicism, a less lovely
language than the early T. S. Eliot, for example
(whose Prufrock has "known them all already, known
them all"). This language is a monotone and contains
a dullness at the center, an echo of the dullness of the
age. But behind the sarcasm lurks a feeling of desperation and a sorrow that the holy relics of our age really do not contain a satisfying truth. One feels that
Ferlinghetti would like to believe.
Peter DeVries is a variation of this third type of
modern thinker, who seems always to be saying, "God,
I cannot believe in you." A Dutch Calvinist, who claims
to have shed his heritage and his faith, DeVries cannot
leave God alone--even now that he has rejected him.
Anne Sexton, The Awful Rowing Toward God (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 28-29.
"Lawrence Ferlinghetti, "I am Waiting," A Coney Island of
the Mind (New York: New Directions, 1958), p. 50.

Every one of his novels seems to be a challenge to God
for direct intervention. In The Blood of the Lamb, a
father sees the stigmata on his dying child's body.
Then I touched the stigmata one by one: the prints of
the needles, the wound in the breast that had for so
many months now scarcely ever closed. I caressed the
perfectly shaped head. I bent to kiss the cheeks, the
breasts that would now never be fulfilled , that no youth
would ever touch. "Oh, my lamb."9
After the child dies, the father reenters a church he
had visited earlier in the day and discovers the birthday cake he had intended to give to her and inadvertently left on a church pew. He takes the cake out of
the box and on his way out of the church, he hurls it
at the figure of Christ.
It was miracle enough that the pastry should reach its
target at all, at that height from the sidewalk. The more
so that it should land squarely, just beneath the crown
of thorns. Then through scalded eyes I seemed to see
the hands free themselves of the nails and move slowly
toward the soiled face . Very slowly, very deliberately,
with infinite patience, the icing was wiped from the eyes
and flung away. I could see it fall in clumps to the
porch steps. Then the cheeks were wiped down with the
same sense of grave and gentle ritual, with all the kind
sobriety of one whose voice could be heard saying, "Suffer the little children to come unto me . . . for of such
is the kingdom of heaven."(237)
DeVries provides an ambiguous picture. Does Christ
wipe away the cake with patience and love and understanding? Or does the narrator see a different kind of
God~ne whose outstretched arms close in on himself
in a gesture of defense? It is unclear. What is clear is
that DeVries has written a twentieth-century version of
Doestoevsky's "The Grand Inquisitor" without the context of The Brothers Karamazov. God is put on trial and
held accountable in DeVries' book. Finally, DeVries
finds no consolation and no real hope, only "the recognition of how long, how long is the mourners' bench
upon which we sit, arms linked in undeluded
friendship, all of us, brief links, ourselves, in the eternal pity." (246)
O'Connor's categories end here, but I would add
one more-the modern thinker who has found God,
she thinks, but whose understanding of God limits the
development of the characters. Alice Walker's Celie in
The Color Purple finally cannot be the character she
wants to be because Walker's theology is not substantial enough to contain her. What Alice Walker does in
this novel is similar in some respects to what many

7

"Peter DeVries, The Blood of the Lamb (New York: Penguin
Books, 1961), p. 234.
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Christian novelists find themselves doing: preaching
and imposing ideology, rather than allowing the characters free will. O'Connor notes the problems inherent
in the work of the Christian:
Students often have the idea that the process at work
here is one which hinders honesty. They think that inevitably the writer, instead of seeing what is, will see
only what he believes. It is perfectly possible, of course,
that this will happen. Ever since there have been such
things as novels, the world has been flooded with bad
fiction for which the religious impulse has been responsible. The sorry religious novel comes about when the
writer supposes that because of his belief, he is somehow dispensed from the obligation to penetrate concrete reality. ( 163)
It is a temptation for the Christian artist to preach,
to veer into the propagandistic, to avoid what O'Connor has called "concrete reality," and thereby to create
second-rate art. Those who have a sacramental understanding of art-O'Connor, Percy, Greene-hold a
prominent position among Christian artists because
they are unafraid of the natural world and use it as a
means of approaching spiritual truth. It is this incarnational and sacramental foundation that will provide
the only solid basis for the Christian writer.
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Luther writes in Article XIII of his "Apology of the
Augsburg Confession": "As the Word enters through
the ears to strike the heart, so the rite itself enters
through the eyes to move the heart. The word and the
rite have the same effect, as Augustine said so well
when he called the sacrament 'the visible Word,' for
the rite is received by the eyes and is a sort of picture
of the Word, signifying the same thing as the Word."
The sacraments, then, are tied inextricably to the
senses of hearing and seeing. Anyone who embraces
the "heresy of the abstract" (see Flannery O'Connor's
story, "Parker's Back") will definitely be uncomfortable
in the realm of art because all art, poetry included, is
grounded in the sensuous world-as are the sacraments.
Through the mundane bursts the transcendent.
What is the sacramental except that which is both tangible and unapproachable, that which is both a mystery and a handle on the mystery, that which is human
and divine, the metaphysical connection of disparate
elements? John Shea writes, "The sacramental imagination always keeps the reality and presence of God
joined to the reality and presence of the finite world.
. . . We cannot talk about our relationship with God
without talking about our finite relationships; and we
cannot talk about our finite relationships at any depth
without talking about our relationship to God." 10
Poetry itself is a sacramental reality. It is an intensity
of spirit into flesh. Poetry is forever shoving itself into
our limited vision. Poetry, like dance, is the motion toward, the exhalation of the invisible, the inhalation of
the visible. The poet, the dancer, the sacramental, our
Lord, intrude on the everyday world in similar ways.
Pure movement, total gesture, exquisite balance, a circular motion which turns inward to intense listening
and outward to transfer the abstract to the absolutely
concrete.
And so often we press away from beauty because we
think we cannot understand it. We resort to cliche, to
the easy phrase, to generalization, to dogma in order
to avoid confronting the physical, but the poet's vision
must be directed toward the concrete, toward what he
sees, feels, tastes, hears, and smells. Even faith-and
what an abstract word that is-even that-especially
that-must be directed toward a person-god who has
always existed but who burst through history and lived
a concrete thirty-three-year life before he ascended
into Life.
So how does this work practically for me as a writer
who happens also to be Christian? First of all, it forces
me beyond cliches-which are invisible and even dis'

0

John Shea, Stories of Faith (Chicago: Thomas More Press,
1980), pp. 97-98.
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honest forms of language. What does cliche-ridden
language mean? Nothing or anything in particular.
What truth does cliche pierce? No truth at all.
Secondly, it forces me to confront what I see which
often is not pleasant. Poetry does not allow lies. It demands everything of the poet-in other words, truth.
And often this truth will not be easy. If the poet believes that the Word of God is Jesus Christ (John 1: 1),
then He as Word becomes the standard for the poet's
words. Whatever is inadequate or unintentionally
heretical in the poetry will, because of the Christian
poet's faith in Christ his Lord, "not be reckoned as a
sin or defect" (Luther, Smalcald Articles, part III, article
XIII). This is not cheap grace. This is the human condition, which, of course, is what poetry also describes.
As much as a frail human work can reflect God's
grace, the Christian poet's work will, because he is
also, besides being sinful, redeemed.
Poetry also requires the poet to confront the contradiction of human life, which is grounded in the fallen world, but drawn toward God. In the very middle
of chaos, in the center of disorder and dirt, one will
often find God's signs of order and reason, even
beauty. Death, for example, is the antithesis of elegance, but in the funeral service and in the communion service, which are dependent on the scandal of the
cross for their meaning, we see a poignant beauty and
our spirits are touched forever.
As a Christian writer, I can show the unities God
has allowed me to experience-and that is why juxtaposition is so important. Metaphor allows me to
unify my experience. If I can show my understanding
of one part of God's world by using another part of
his world, isn't that saying something about an underlying unity? The more metaphysical the comparison,
the better, for God has allowed me to take fragments
and join them to get at truth. Sister Corita Kent has
written about this holy unity, saying that "it seems that
perhaps there is nothing unholy/ nothing unrelated/
and that as we fit things together/ synthesize rather
than analyze/ we might be coming closer to god's view
from which all must somehow fit together." 11
Metaphor is not luxury; it is not just adornment. It
is essential for communication. The metaphysical poets
of the seventeenth century with their exaggerated conceits of lovers and compasses and of mailbags cut into
Christ's side, Flannery O'Connor with her peacocks
and dark woods and the drowning waters of baptism,
T. S. Eliot with his thunder, his bird, and his silently
wheeling circles, Faulkner with his clocks, his bear, his
wisteria-these and all writers would have nothing to
11

Sister Corita Kent, Footnotes and Headlines: A Play-Pray
Book (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), p. 24.
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say if they did not have metaphor. Some critics have
suggested that communication is completely impossible
without metaphor. 12
Mysteries can never be apprehended directly. The
metaphor provides the indirection which finally is able
to reveal truth--or at least get closest to it. In one of
Robertson Davies' novels, one character, Sam, laughs
at the preacher's use of metaphor. Another character
is unimpressed and observes, "If he hoped to make an
atheist of me, this was where he went wrong; I knew
a metaphor when I heard one and I like metaphor
better than reason. I have known many atheists since
Sam, and they all fall down on metaphor." 13 The problem for the Christian writer is that many of the
metaphors of the faith have become cliches. It is the
writer's task to revitalize these metaphors and to infuse
religious expression with a light that time has
shadowed.
Story is a necessary vehicle for this process, for story
allows the metaphors varied contexts. Amos Wilder
says, "The storyteller and poet are both fabulists; and
with the help of such signals as tone, rhythm, gesture,
and pace they usher us into a heightened world or
another world. They cast their spell. Magic claps his
hood upon our benighted perception and we awaken
to worlds unknown." 14
John Dominic Crossan has suggested that perhaps
our attraction to story is connected with the limits that
the structure of story imposes. He relates story to
game and says that the reason we play games with
stringent rules is to show that we can overcome the obstacles and win anyway, even if we lose hundreds of
times more than we win. In fact, a game is no fun if
it is too easy. "Having absolutely limited myself with a
story," he writes, "whether this, that, or some other
story, I do not feel constrained or confined because,
as with my earlier analogy of game, I find that limitation exhilarating." 15
The appeal of story lies in its mythic roots. Northrop Frye has identified four different types of mythic
structures operative in narrative: comedy, tragedy, romance, and irony. Lawrence Ellsbee speaks of the five
generic plots he has discovered in literature: establishing a home, fighting a battle, taking a journey, endur12

See TeSelle, pp. 43-65. She names Stanley Burnshaw,
Samuel Coleridge, Ernst Cassirer, Owen Barfield, John
Middlton Murray, C. Day-Lewis, and Elizabeth Sewell,
among others.
1
'Robertson Davies, Fifth Business (New York: Viking Press,
1970; rpt. Penguin Books, 1977), pp. 54-55.
14
Amos Wilder, "Story and Story-World," Interpretation, Vol.
XXXVII, October, 1983, p. 356.
15
John Dominic Crossan, The Dark Interval: Towards a Theology of Story (Niles, IL: Argus Communications, 1975),
p. 40.
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ing suffering, and pursuing consummation.' 6 Wilder,
on the other hand, says, "sometimes one is tempted to
think that there is only one story in the world summed
up in the formula of 'lost and found,' and that all the
stories long and short in the New Testament or the
Bible itself are variations on this theme." TeSelle concurs and says that not only the Bible but all of Western literature is based on this lost-found struggle."

We practice our own lives and our own
deaths through story and, finally, we
receive truth itself through story.
Some recent fiction has become more self-conscious
in its use of story. Harriet Doerr's Stones for Ibarra, for
example, shows story operating as a way of capturing
the past and living it as the present moment. But it
also shows two people creating their own story out of
past photographs and future images and welding this
narrative to the narratives of an entire village to create
the history of a place. The novel is a collection of
stories, each one expressing a small bit of the truth,
each one showing how individual stories merge to
create legend. 18 Gabriel Garcia Marquez's Chronicles of
a Death Foretold is a strange foretelling, telling, and retelling of a murder from the vantage points of various
characters until finally what is mere blood and gore
becomes legend. 19 Russell Hoban's Riddley Walker is a
post-holocaust novel about a culture that has lost most
of its connections with the past. The myths of this
civilization are transmitted during puppet-show performances and are based on surviving scraps of information about twentieth-century culture. In the primitive language that has survived, one of the characters
explains how story happens.
I said, 'Then whered the other story come from? ..
He said, 'It come in to my mynd.'
I said, 'You mean you made it up.'
He said, 'Wei no I dint make it up you cant make up
nothing in your head no moren you can make up what
you see. You know what I mean may be what you see
aint all ways there so you cud reach out and touch it
but its there some where. That place, ... I used to
wunner about it every time we come by it til finely that
Lawrence Ellsbee, The Rituals of Life: Patterns in Narratives (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1982).
"Amos N. Wilder, The Language of the Gospel: Early Christian Rhetoric (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 67,
as quoted by Sally TeSelle, Speaking in Parables, p. 123.
'"Harriet Doerr, Stones for Ibarra (New York: Viking Pen'
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trans. Gregory Rabassa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1983).
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story come in to my head. That story cudnt come out
of no where cud i~ so it musve come out of some where.
Parbly it ben in that place from time back way back or
may be in a nother place only the idear of it come to
me there. That dont make no odds. That story jus what
ever it is and thats what storys are.' 20
In Riddley Walker story is the only way culture can be
transmitted.
Scripture, too, relies heavily on narrative. Northrop
Frye has identified the "U-shaped" structures in biblical stories-a structure which finally is the movement
from Genesis to Revelation. This U-shape, like the
structure of comedy, moves from a pleasant state to
loss to restoration, and informs all of the stories of Israel. Frye notes that "the same U-narrative is found
outside the historical sections also, in the account of
the disasters and restoration of Job and in Jesus' parable of the prodigal son."
This emphasis on narrative, through which spiritual
truth is presented, separates the Bible from many
other sacred books and Frye suggests that story is used
in order to transcend story. "In a sense, therefore, the
deliverance of Job is a deliverance from his own story,
the movement in time that is transcended when we
have no further need of time. Much the same thing
would be true of the relation of Jesus to the Passion
narrative, which is the kernel of the Gospels. The inference for the reader seems to be that the angel of
time that man clings to until daybreak ... is both an
enemy and an ally, a power that both enlightens and
cripples, and disappears only when all that can be experienced has been experienced." 21
Story, indeed, seems to be a necessity in our intellectual, imaginative, and spiritual lives. It is a way for us
to contain and finally conquer time. Story transmits
culture through its mythic structures. Story allows us
to express our most hidden fears, our secret wishes,
our desires for personal integration. It allows us to
catch glimpses of ourselves and of God. Story is a sign
that the human spirit craves the truth about itself.
Story and metaphor, then, are our handles on the
mysteries. The stuffy individual who pushes his glasses
up his nose and sniffs, "I read only nonfiction,'' has
deliberately separated himself from the story that is
his own life. Until one confronts his own story
through the stories of scripture, myth, legend, and
classic literature, one cannot finally transcend his own
life story. We practice our own lives and our own
deaths through story and, finally, we receive truth itRussell Hoban, Riddley Walker (New York: Washington
Square Press, 1980), pp. 93-94.
21
Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1982), pp. 169,
198.
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self through story. A Christian cannot base her life on
pure dogma, on an abstract theology or philosophy.
She must always begin and end with story.
Cl

Appendix A
No Apples in this Garden, Sir
My neighbor
who lives in a shingle stained house
and grows tomatoes fat as babies' bellies
who brings me his own orange marmalade,
Ozark songs,
bright Christmas marzipan of
carrots, eggs, and pineapples
Who planted a cherry tree
on my side of
our fence
Who picks raspberries
and lifts broccoli out of his piece of
city dirt
My neighbor cut down his
apple tree
branch by
branch
before it bloomed this spring.
It stands there now an
amputee.
A house away a blank blue pool stares back at me.
In his dream
the apples came down
fast, popping off the birds' bath,
the season punctuated by crickets and the
sound of
apples plummeting
one by one into the
softened ears,
upon the scraped walk,
the tin-roofed porch.
Above the impatiens two apples
poised and swooned on their lilting branch.
(The lawn last year was crushed green apples,
squirrels, and apple breath.)
And that other fruit
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His fine filament of child
the one who is and will be, but
hardly ever was.
That one sweet (tender) dream
crawled into the summer
garden and the apples
held their breath
before they fell an apple fall.
The tree came down.
No bruises strong as cucumbers for any
saucy child this year
or next.
And apple wood burns slow and neat
he says.

Appendix B
Eine Kleine
The owner squeezes from behind the worktable
to the cabinet with reeds,
neckrests, pegs, valve oil.
A box of kazoos squats on the counter.
Rosin dust and the dust of old
music, old violins, the polishing
rags, the cylinders of fresh gut
strings and my child fingering the leather
straps of her case.
He lifts the smudged wood from its velvet bag
and plucks
dead sound,
loosens strings,
unwraps the pegs,
disgorges flat, thin notes
and the violin spits wires.
Newly strung, the tightened notes careen
and waver,
balance in their place
and shift.
Tonight she'll play the resonance of
wood and string
and halfway through the
piece she'll stop
and wrap the strings more snugly to the pegs,
her hair a dark vibrato,
the room will ring with fatness ,
the lampcord swaying underneath a milky shade.
The Cresset
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Pressed for Time
Richard Lee
You know Ronald Reagan is
wobbling from lame duck to dead
duck when his friends start to wonder, and lately to worry, about his
place in history. To his considerable credit, the President appears
unconcerned about his place in history and apparently continues to
enjoy the work he gives himself to
do in the moment. Reagan has always seemed indifferent to history
generally, and that flaw possibly
saves him from an excessive preoccupation with himself, much less
the place of his Presidency in history.
His admirers might well take a
leaf from his book. To be sure,
myth and fantasy are rarely preferable to history, but history also has
its limits. It has become the god of
secular men and women who hope
it will vindicate their lives and preserve their works.
"With history the final judge of
our deeds," wrote Theodore Sorensen for John F. Kennedy's inaugural address, "let us go forth to
lead the land we love . . . knowing
that here on earth God's work must
truly be our own." With the possible exception of Reagan , succeeding Presidents have found at least
part of "God's work" on earth to be
setting the record straight in their
memoirs and establishing their
Presidential Libraries.*
The problem with history as a
god is that for all its enlarging perspectives it remains the work of
February, 1987

mortals, and historians no less than
Presidents are properly suspect if
they suppose history is the final
judge of anything or aspire to
make "God's work" on earth truly
their own. Those now worried
about Reagan's place in history had
rather worry about who will write
it, read it, teach it, perhaps learn it
and possibly remember it in the future.
If the safest truth of the
economist is: in the long run, we
are all dead, the safest truth of the
historian is: in the long run, we are
all forgotten. The time could come
when Ronald Reagan will be remembered on a microchip with
Millard Fillmore and Franklin
Pierce, perhaps cross-referenced
with George Murphy and Charlton
Heston.
The President's admirers, of
course, are not thinking in terms of
Ozymandian centuries when they
worry about his place in history.
Presumably they have in mind
about three or four generations,
which is about as long a place in
history as any President can reasonably hope. This is time enough for
the memoirs and hagiographiesjustifications and sanctifications-to
be written and the first histories
published, then a revisionist generation for second thoughts, then a
generation of mummifying neglect,
and finally a generation of rediscovery before the dust settles at
last. Unfortunately, Reagan's place
in even this nearer term of history
cannot be anticipated with any
surety, and today's newspapers are
not necessarily the trial drafts of to*As I write, the Christmas mail produces an enticement from the Easton
Press for The Library of the Presidents
which offers "selected writings of our
most notable Presidents and the personally signed memoirs of our three living
former Presidents: Nixon, Ford and Carter. This is our heritage and it can be

your heirloom, a library f Presidential history that will itself make history." (Italics in original.)

morrow's history books.
I do not refer to the biases of future historians, though biases there
will be, and tomorrow like today
one who reads one history reads no
history. More important is the fact
that we cannot predict with any
certainty the questions historians
will ask, or the historical causations
they may seek, a few generations
hence. (If the development of SDI
survives his Presidency, if that development generates as much
wealth as it drains away, if it succeeds as an unprovocative nuclear
shield, if et cetera, history may not
remember Reagan as the last cheerleader of technological utopia but
the first great realist of the twentyfirst century.)
Unfair as it may seem, the future
arrives asking questions we were
not answering in our own times.
History not only relativizes our
achievements in the succeeding
light of their unintended consequences, but it also finds more
fault with our failures to confront
the problems we did not see than
with our mistakes in handling the
problems we did see. History as a
god is more sad than savage, and it
tends to dwell more in sorrow on
our squandered opportunities than
in anger at our follies.
I should not be understood to
know what will be Ronald Reagan's
place in history. Even less do I
know the future of history itself. I
should imagine Reagan as a historical subject will be endlessly engaging, for few persons have lived a
life so intersected and imprinted by
the major developments of the
twentieth century. He is a veritable
totem pole of our times.
But my advice to Reagan's admirers is to let history take care of
itself and help him get on with the
work at hand. Those who try to
fudge or force a Presidential record upon history are likely to discover it is tricky history which says
"You ain't seen nothin' yet."
Cl
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Foreign Policy
Games, Again
Paul H. Brietzke
Several readers felt that my column of three months ago ("America's Foreign Policy Game(s)")
lacked specificity. Recent events
concerning Iran provide new
means to be all too specific about
our foreign policy failings . These
events will continue to unfold, but
I will discuss the lessons we can
draw as of mid-December, when
this column is being written.
Art Buchwald puts it well: "Every
time I feel my credulity has been
stretched to its limit someone
stretches it some more." The President, apparently "standing tall"
only three months ago, is keeping
his head well down like a (lame)
duck during hunting season. The
press has not yet agreed upon a
catchy name for what sounds like
the plot for a bad spy novel. The
New York Post's "Iran$cam" seems
the best name for an arms sale to
Iran, in exchange for hostages held
in Lebanon, with assists from Israel
and Saudi Arabia and the proceeds, laundered in Switzerland,
going to Nicaraguan rebels.
Why did this "initiative" blow up

Paul H. Brietzke, a regular contributor to The Cresset on public affairs, teaches in the School of Law at
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in the President's face? Why is it so
much worse than mining Nicaraguan harbors and then walking out
on the World Court, putting
"peacekeeping" forces in and
alongside Lebanon, attacking Grenada and Libya? Iran$cam joins together at the hip the tar babies of
American foreign policy, Iran and
Nicaraguan rebels.
Many
Americans have
not
bought into the Administration's
hate campaign against the Government of Nicaragua. In contrast to
"strategists" in the White House
basement, many Americans recognize the "Contras" for Samoza
clones who will do little with our
aid, apart from enriching Miami's
underground economy.
But we have learned too well
from politicians and the media to
hate Iran and its leaders. Like
other attempts to manipulate public
opinion, these hate campaigns had
to backfire sooner or later. Just before he resigned 1 to take a Wati
Street job, the President's Press
Secretary indignantly challenged
reporters to let the American
people decide what to do over
Iran. We can only hope that we get
the chance to decide, in a way that
will offer an object-lesson to future
leaders.
Bumperstickers to the contrary
notwithstanding, the Ayatollah is
not foaming-at-the-mouth crazy.
He seems not very much crazier
than other preachers who would
translate
their
fundamentalist
bigotry directly into political action.
If we are honest, we must admit
that the Ayatollah is in no small
measure of our own making. Our
setting-up and propping-up of the
Shah made a revolutionary leader
like Khomeini likely and possibly
inevitable. Having helped the
Shah's SA VAK practice terrorism
on Iranians for so long, can we be
surprised if Iranians now help
' . terronsm
.
ot hers practiCe
on us ?.
But how can we do any "busi-

ness" with a regime which held our
Embassy employees hostage and
now engages in bloody war and
persistent human rights violations?
Admiral Poindexter acted like the
Admiral Mahan of our era, pursuing Iran as a glittering geo-political
prize. With the resources and
population to dominate its region,
Iran stands between the Soviet
Union and its desire for a warmwater port. All that glitters is not
gold however, and the Soviets have
more to fear from Iran than vice
versa. The Soviets' plight in Afghanistan would seem a picnic
compared to an invasion of Iran.
If we were real geopoliticians, we
would have sent Iran powerful
radio transmitters instead, transmitters capable of igniting the many
Soviet Muslims with fundamentalist
Iranian diatribes against a godless
communism. It is far from clear
that the "moderate" Iranian leaders
we supposedly helped with arms
sales are better bulwarks against
the Soviets than communist-hating
fundamentalists. It is likely, in any
event, that these moderates exert
their influence only in the White
House basement.

We have learned too
well from politicians
and the media to hate
Iran and its leaders.
Iranian meddling certainly causes
a regional instability, but it by no
means follows that an end to its
meddling will create stability or
that arms sales will lead to less
rather than more meddling. We get
only 2-4 per cent of our oil from
the Persian Gulf. Why not let
Japan (60 %) and Europe (20%)
protect their (and thus our) interests, given that Gulf states must
sell a great deal of oil in the long
run if they are to stay afloat
economically?
The Cresset

The
Reagan
Administration
should have taken the advice its
darlings, the Chicago School
economists, would presumably give:
stand by and wait because, like any
other cartel, OPEC will collapse
through squabbling. In sum, the
best policy we could have followed
in revolutionary Iran, and in much
of the Middle East, is a benign neglect, with substantial amounts of
non-military aid contingent on demonstrable
improvements
in
human rights and on a cessation of
terrorism.
This is a policy most Americans
and many Iranians would endorse,
yet the Reagan Administration pursued the exact opposite policy.
Why?
Its
"national
security"
strategists are wedded to a reflexive, outmoded balance of power
theory; the Soviets arm the Iraqis
and, for that reason alone, we must
arm Iran. As neither Iraq or Iran
serves our interests, as these are
perceived in the White House basement, we apparently arm the
weaker side to keep the war between them going as long as possible. Even if guns do not kill people,
Iranians with guns will kill more
people than Iranians without guns.
Administration claims that it
supplied these arms to end the war
make as much sense as its analogous policies of deterrence and
mutually assured destruction, but
that would be the subject of
another column.
It is deeply immoral to save the
lives of a few hostages by providing
the means for the deaths of many
innocents. Reagan denied that this
was his aim, just as he denied trading Zakharov for Daniloff, thereby
opening a credibility gap as wide as
the one Johnson faced over Vietnam or Nixon provoked with
Watergate. Even successful Presidents must apparently face their
Gotterdammerung.

Americans are scandalized because Iran$cam seems as stupid as
February, 1987

it is immoral, even to people who
would do almost anything to free
hostages. The release of one hostage in Lebanon did follow hard
upon each arms delivery to Iran.
But this offends a sense of proportion, and we can never assume that
Iran controls the terrorist groups it
apparently befriends.

If the arms deal was a
fig leaf, preserving
the appearance of our
refusing to negotiate
with terrorists, the
terrorists will surely
be the last to be fooled.
If the arms deal was a fig leaf,
preserving the appearance of our
refusing to negotiate with terrorists, the terrorists will be the last
to be fooled. The arrangement is
too open-ended; it sets up a pattern rather than appearing as one
dirty deal. It would have been
cheaper to bribe the terrorists directly
rather
than
indirectly
through Israel and Iran but, either
way, more hostages will be
snatched for more ransom. Even
the White House basement boys
had to know this, and to be willing
to bear the costs.
Lord Carrington, NATO Secretary-General, expressed one such
cost when he looked toward heaven
and made an imploring gesture
over Iran$cam. How can we now
eliminate Europeans' post-Iceland
crisis of confidence in our foreign
policy? How can we convince
France to be less cozy with Syria?
What do we tell "friends" like
Egypt, Jordan, and Kuwait, who
make common cause with Iraq out
of a fear of Islamic fundamentalism?
The New York Times also reported
a phantom cost, the sidetracking of
our role in the Mideast "peace

process." Even an optimist would
be hard put to find such a process
and to then find someone in power
who believed in our self-proclaimed
role of "honest broker." (I ignore
those leaders who pay lip service to
this role in order to obtain our
arms, through what may be called
the Hussein Gambit.) Indeed, one
of the few benefits of Iran$cam is
that it underscores the fact that we
have had no Mideast policy since
the Camp David accords.
Why is there no policy? Simply
because Defense, State, the CIA,
and the White House basement
boys are constantly shooting from
the hip-usually at each other. The
President's grasp of fundamentals
and detail, and his control over
staff, have been questioned before;
Iran$cam merely makes the issue
of his fitness to govern more poignant.
Watergate raised the question:
"What did the President know and
when did he know it?" Iran$cam
prompts us to ask: "What did the
President forget, and when did he
forget it?" His "need not to know"
unpleasant things and his inability
to establish mechanisms for advice
and accountability-to say nothing
of an overall chain of commandare the proximate causes of
Iran$cam.
It is significant that the Secretaries of State and Defense apparently objected to Iran$scam and
that their objections did not prevail. Each has access to expertise in
his Department, an expertise often
woefully
inadequate
yet
far
superior to any in the White House
basement. Both Secretaries operate
chains of command which offer
some hope that zanier initiatives will
be filtered out on the way up.
In contrast, there is no apparent
organization in the White House
basement; no matter how misguided, the preference of one man
reporting to himself can prevail
under presidential inattention. As
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things stand, the basement boys are
badly out of touch with reality over
Iran$cam. One of them is quoted
as saying: "One misstep and we can
fall on our butt"-as if this has not
happened
already.
Treating
Iran$cam as a "damage control"
exercise in public relations, they
seem to be operating from the
Nixon playbook when they throw a
couple of lesser people to the
wolves, let out a bit of information,
and hope for the best.

Donald Regan argued that
the President can "bend"
an arms embargo for
reasons of "statecraft."
The best would be that the President and the Secretaries of State
and Defense together develop a
coherent national security policy.
Instead, this task supposedly falls
to the National Security Council.
Diffusion of responsibility on the
Council has frequently encouraged
irresponsible frolics in the past,
especially when the basement boys
dominate and/or the CIA tail wags
the Council dog. This organizational mess must be straightened
out soon, before more exploding
cigars are sent to Castro and more
arms are sent to heaven knows
where.
Secrecy is the main reason why
an official gets out of touch with
reality and why the ploys of foreign
policy actors lack coordination. The
left hand cannot know what the
right is doing. A few things must
obviously be kept secret, but the
desire for secrecy rises in direct
proportion to the stupidity of the
action undertaken. Secrecy must be
curbed because it deprives us of
Congress' constitutional role of
struggling with the executive to define our foreign policy interests.
Iran$cam would never have gotten
off the ground during such a
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struggle, and that would have been
all to the good.
Another benefit of Iran$cam is
that it will provoke Congress into
taking a harder look at other Administration initiatives. In particular, the Contras can go whistle for
future lawful arms shipments.
Iran$cam taught us that postWatergate reforms designed to inform Congress, and those Congress
negotiated with the CIA's Casey
after the agency's mmmg of
Nicaragua's harbors was exposed,
do not work. Stronger legislation is
needed if Iran$cam can go forward
on Attorney General Meese's determination that much or all of it is
legal. (Meese's ethics and competence are being carefully evaluated
by those Valparaiso University professors who dissented from awarding this Lutheran an honorary de-

gree.)
Donald Regan argued that the
President can "bend" an arms embargo for reasons of "statecraft" because he has "more than normal"
powers. This calls up visions of the
Imperial Presidency that we have
tried and rejected before. String up
Don Regan if you wish, put the
best face on Iran$cam you can;
events have already borne out Senator Patrick Leahy's characterization. He sees in Iran$cam "the
worst foreign policy fiasco in years
and years"-and that's saying something.
If we do not learn from our mistakes, we will no doubt repeat
them. Bad luck could lead to nuclear war next time, and our
foreign policy should be based on
something more reliable than
dumb luck.
Cl

A Good Deed
I get hit in the shin with a two-tone wingtip when
a negro falls over a sales shoe rack. I ask
what's the hurry as he stumbles looking for
his things. Then his head g~ts jerked by a distant shout
and he's a thief I think, so I tackle him
in a pile of marked-down sneakers. I hold him tight.
He starts to cry, and let go of me he cries
and please let me go. But he asks for something I
can't give: forgiveness from Montgomery Ward.
I help him, locked in my arms, to stand, lead him
from the ruined display and down the long mall.
People stop and watch the odd procession
pass, for now a sort of policeman grips
my negro's arm, and a girl with a walkie-talkie
carries the shopping bag triumphantly.
We deliver the captive to an office full
of men with crossed arms.
Later a freckled
guard explains that those kind of people get
the book thrown at them by Montgomery Ward.

Mark Van Wienen
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the scientific disciplines-in short,
the basic body of knowledge which
universities once took it upon
themselves as their obligation to
transmit, under the name of a liberal education, from ages past to
ages present and future.

A Seraglio in
Dolby Sound?
Charles Vandersee
Dear Editor:
A few fortnights ago in the city
of Washington, which one sometimes thinks of as the farce capital
of the Free World, they were
counting spies and finding the
Soviet Union had sent over too
many. Shortly thereafter, Moscow,
the farce capital of the Other
World, was pulling its 200 toiletbowl and snack-bar attendants out
of the U.S. embassy in Moscow.
And Mr. Bennett was in Cambridge, Mass.
Mr. Bennett, of Washington, its
Office of Education, was lecturing
about the failure of American universities to provide certain essentials:
at a minimum, a systematic
familiarization with our own, Western tradition of learning: with the
classical and Jewish-Christian heritage, the facts of American and
European history, the political organization of Western societies, the
great works of Western art and literature, the major achievements of

Charles Vandersee, of Albemarle
County, Virginia, has had poems in a
recent issue of Sewanee Review and
also one reprinted in the Georgia Review Fortieth Anniversary Poetry R etrospective.
February, 1987

It's like Pentelic marble and gold
leaf, this vision of the "heritage,"
the "great works," the "major
achievements," but like children
trying to build a Ferris wheel with
Lincoln Logs, the result in our
times is likely to be chaos.
And not grand chaos either. Isn't
Italy a heptarchy, except for the
bandits of Sicily? When Mrs.
Thatcher retires, does Whitehall
turn into a watery sherry trifle? Behind the Iron Curtain, the dour
dachas of the Kremlin are internally warring with what unpredictable inevitabilities? The Norwegian
parliament, or nimbus, is, is it not,
a bisexual legislature, and the oldest self-inseminating body in Europe. Its members select the Nobel
Prize winners, and a plume of
smoke indicates that the indictment
has been returned.
That is the nature of "familiarization," five years, let's say, after the
B.A. The enterprise is Alice, and if
stretched over four years of col-

lege, a small Wonderland veiled
and clinking, like a seraglio in
Dolby sound.
I indulge in low comedy only because Mr. Bennett is displaying a
bit of Washington opera bouffe.
Washington tends, they say, to try
to solve massive social problems by
"throwing money." It is tempting to
set forth as a liberal education a
stage full of plywood facades .
What happens after the money is
spent? What endures after a student successfully completes "a set of
fundamental courses, ordered, purposive, coherent"? (This from later
in Mr. Bennett's speech.) I keep
asking myself what endures because I have suspicions. What we
are taught-with emphasis on
order, purpose, and coherence--is
not necessarily what we learn. What
we attempt is not necessarily what
we achieve.
A liberal education is an architectural project. Mr. Bennett's can be
improved, and in giving it better
form I will pass quickly over obvious objections to it, assuming that
they pretty much answer themselves. Someone, for example, will
argue that he places too much emphasis on what are called "inert"
facts. But such a caviler will have
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had an intellectual hysterectomy,
since any real fact has power to inseminate. Mr. Bennett's word "systematic" may imply a "lockstep"
progression of study: first, the
political organization of England,
then of France, then Germany,
then Poland, finally Andorra, and
so forth (yawn). But the actual goings-on in a country like Poland
(when added to the supposed organization) will not be sleep-inducing.
People will say we cannot get
"consensus" on which great works
to study. But we can do well
enough without getting Larry Flynt
and Phyllis Schlafly to agree. There
will be fears of "teaching for the
test," but this assumes that faculty
are unimaginative crones, and
surely many are not.
So leave all that aside. Probably
the main question to deal with is
the matter of "familiarity." To my
mind, this means both the inside
and outside of things. Years ago,
when riding a bike across town to
high school, I grew familiar with
the outsides of a good many houses
in one Indiana town. But inside,
how were they laid out? What
idiosyncrasies of decor, what woodwork and bric-a-brac? In the minds
of these retired German farmers
and these steelworkers who drove
every day to Gary, what views of
the cosmos were fermenting? Did
everybody hate F.D.R., or just
people my parents knew, or just
my father? The simulated-stone
siding on these houses did not
speak.
Mr. Bennett seems to emphasize
lists-facts, works, achievementsand what he calls a "minimum"
seems to have a lot of things on it.
My own stress would be on linkssetting inside a few things and seeing where they lead. He believes
in a "body" of knowledge; I would
be exploring the mysterious soul,
which one might call "human consciousness."
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Now I recogmze that Mr. Bennett has in mind one major link,
the link among "works" and
"achievements" which he calls
"heritage." For example, the line
that connects Magna Carta, the
Ninety-Five Theses, the Declaration
of Independence, and "I Have a
Dream." If a student hasn't, by
fourteenth grade, looked at this
often-frayed linkage, Mr. Bennett
and I agree that he should stop,
cease, divest himself of his stereo,
and spend part of the summer m
penance and fascinated perusal.

People will say we
cannot get "consensus"
on which great works to
study. But we can do
well enough without
getting Phyllis Schlafly
and Larry Flynt to agree.
But a "heritage" of personal freedom, the splendid counterforce to
dictatorship, ecclesiastical tyranny,
and ethnocentrism, is not the only
heritage. Other important heritages
arise from the simple existence of
intractable human consciousness.
In a poetry course last fall I chose
to lay a little emphasis on conflict.
Samuel Johnson, both learned and
sensible, nonetheless disliked Milton and despised the shenanigans
of Donne. Frost thought Eliot, in
The Waste Land, was maybe kidding
around. Wordsworth was out of patience with the poetic diction of the
eighteenth century. Robert Lowell
in Life Studies was out of patience
with his own methods of the previous decade. So "heritage" must be
seen also as cross purposes. We
need lists, but items linked by the
human fact that "great works" and
"major accomplishments" produced
controversy.
The Bible, for example, is not

only a crucial source of the Western "heritage"-its stories, images,
beliefs, and ideals; it is also, significantly, a chronicle of conflict. If
a student should be "familiarized"
with Noah, let us say, or Moses, or
David, or Martha, or Thomas, let
that familiarization emphasize the
perennial conflict of humankind
with divinity. That link is what's
crucial-and it's what helps a
reader remember the stories themselves.
The "heritage" is a long story of
perversity; it is not merely a succession of monuments. It is a sevenring circus and a many-layered
charnel-house, not only the Globe
Theatre in Southwark and Carpenters Hall in Philadelphia.
Saying this does not mean that I
think Mr. Bennett believes the opposite. When he insists on "the
facts of American and European
history," he surely includes, as I do,
the wars of religion, the instances
of modern genocide, the myriad
ironies of fine ideals corrupted.
The obligation of liberal education
is to focus clearly upon salient aspects of reality. There is the reality
of imagination, the reality of stultification; the reality of the
courageous, the reality of the craven. Such realities have a way of
evading "system."
And when he advises a "set" of
courses (the emphasis is his), he
surely means linkages among
courses, and probably linkages
within them. I only hope he does
not have in mind overly neat linkages. A golden chain is a thing of
beauty, each polished link joined to
two others. A wooden carriage
wheel handsome to contemplate,
each turned spoke locked to the
hub and to the outer wheel. But
civilization has proceeded like a
game of dominoes, or an underground network of prairie-dog tunnels, or a medieval hamlet that
turned into an industrial city, with
streets that still follow the paths of
The Cresset
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ancient oxen.
Beware of false order, therefore.
Beware of seeing coherence when
also operating were such great
forces as necessity and just living
day by day.
Faithful to the kinds of realities
ascertainable by human consciousness, liberal education may not
have to concern itself very much
with "transmitting," since reality
has a life-force of its own . Or so we
must believe, lest we as teachers
confess to living among petty and
solipsistic fantasies. In fact, a fundamental truth about links, it seems
to me-and it can't be too frequently conveyed to students-is
that "one important thing leads to
another important thing."
You study a few of the important
poems of an important poet named
Yeats; they lead you to reflect upon
oppression, and on the glory and
agony, the "terrible beauty," of resistance. You study British parliamentary activity of the late
nineteen~h and early twentieth centuries, ar.d you notice the recurrent
issue of Home Rule for Ireland ;
soon you find yourself-if not constrained by the "systematic" study of
politics alone--considering certain
great poems of Yeats.
In a letter to one of his many tolerant women friends, the historian
Henry Adams, a man of perverse
consciousness, reflected upon the
Chicago World's Fair of 1893, the
famous "White City" of Beaux Arts
buildings and vaguely Venetian lagoons:
Chicago delighted me. . . . A
pure white temple, on the pure
blue sea, with an Italian sky, all
vast and beautiful as the world
never saw it before, and in it the
most astounding, confused, bewildering mass of art and industry,
without a sign that there was any
connection, relation or harmony or
understanding of the relations of
anything anywhere. I wonder
whether the twenty million visitors
carried off the same sense that I
did.
February 1987

Surely this bewilderment is a recognizable human sensation, and
warrant for Mr. Bennett desiring
"system." But the opposite is true.
If what has happened during the
earth's sojourn in the cosmos is not
wholly chaos, it is at least partly
chaos. The architects of the Fair
constructed both a pleasure ground
and a campus of instruction, just as
at a university we find professors
constructing syllabi and trustees
building stadia. And "familiarization" would begin not with a history of architecture or sports or the
"American mind."

Instead (sticking to the Fair) one
would begin with the idea Chicago
had of itself in the generation after
the Great Fire. Get inside that. One
would range earlier and later,
probing issues such as sectional
rivalry in the U.S.; the reasons for
great wealth in the nation, reasons
legislative and geographical (and
religious); the felt rivalry of the
whole United States when looking
at Europe; and the supposed classical and Renaissance "tradition" of
Europe as defined from the shore
of Lake Michigan. One would
make students build this up, not

The Waves at Padre Island
Riding the waves at Padre Island,
we paddle black innertubes
that lift and drop sharply in each trough.
How many times our children rose
and fell on these balloons
which never sink, which don't leak even now
for two grandparents wallowing
like kids. Those years, we never rode
but waded bobbing in the Gulf to save
spilled babies from the undertow.
Later, we watched them from the beach,
big children swimming farther out
than we dared, these innertubes
like stranded jellyfish. Now, leaned back
on round tight rubber, we swirl
like children on a tilt-a-whirl, spinning
the rest of our lives, laughing
with no one to hear, gasping when one wave
suddenly drops, our eyes
hardly squinting, able to bear
the blunt sea-level sun.

Walter McDonald
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trek past a plywood set.
And one would ponder the name
of the Fair: World's Columbian Exposition. Christoforo had headed
for the Indies. The "Western"
heritage and tradition is not
enough in liberal education, as Professor Renu Juneja has argued in
the Cresset; surely we need "not just
a canon that essentially explores a
common heritage and affirms a
common culture."
Of course, in the unsystematic
way that appeals to me (the method
of "one important thing leading to
another important thing"), certain
essential matters are bound to be
left out. This would be a reasonable objection. I grant this, but I
would want it shown that the systematic approach really does get
more in. And that if in the syllabus,
it also remains in the mind of the
alumnus five years later.
He notably exaggerates, does
Henry Adams, and in the paragraph just cited he goes on: "Precisely what education is, I don't
know. Perhaps to learn chaos when
one sees it." He was writing, we
must remember, from Washington,
a city ever enlarging its sense of itself. You now see there more marble per capita than there is fake
siding in Midwest towns. No wonder its rhetoric becomes magnification.
But perhaps Adams was on to
something, like Mr. Bennett, who
has sojourned among the marble
facades quite a while. If we follow
Adams' thinking, we might conclude that the act of learning chaos
is to diminish chaos. Meaning that
to recognize chaos is to grasp one
salient aspect of reality. We should
prefer, I think, that our students
recognize chaos and farce, in the
hope that five years later, in thinking about their education, they will
not be spewing forth chaos and
farce. We don't need more.
From Dogwood, faithfully yours,

c.v.
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The Things All
Musicians Know
Linda C. Ferguson
In the current literature of
higher
education
recurs
a
metaphor both apt and troubling.
This
metaphor suggests that
academic disciplines are cultures
(or "knowledge communities") each
with its own tools, history, lore, customs, jokes, ethics, laws, and language. If this metaphor holds-and
I am greatly persuaded of its
truth-then preparation in a discipline means more than acquiring
information about its content and
methods, and cross-disciplinary inquiry precludes simple dabbling
and intuitive insights; to study in a
discipline involves a complex process of acculturation, through which
citizenship in the community is
earned.
As a member of the knowledge
community of musicians, I recall
Milton Babbitt's alarming statement, made in 1958, that music, at
least in its higher forms, is forbidding, if not forbidden, territory, as
closed to "tourists" as other technical fields are now assumed to be.
In an infamous article (maligned

Linda C. Ferguson, a regular contributor to The Cresset, teaches in the
Department of Music at Valparaiso
University, where she is also Director of
the Freshman Seminar program.

primarily because of the title its editor assigned, "Who Cares if You
Listen"), he wrote, "The time has
passed when the normally well-educated man without special preparation could understand the most advanced work m, for example,
mathematics,
philosophy,
and
physics. Advanced music, to the extent that it reflects the knowledge
and originality of the informed
composer, scarcely can be expected
to appear more intelligible."
But even in modern times, music
is usually assumed to be a field
which must necessarily extend its
appeal to non-specialists, even as it
requires specialized knowledge and
skills to practice it. Music, then,
would seem to stand in a problematic position with regard to the
metaphor of discipline as culture.

Even in modern times,
music is usually assumed
to be a field which must
necessarily extend its
appeal to non-specialists.
My interest in this prevailing
metaphor and its significance for
my work was stimulated by a recent
institute, called "Hidden Meanings:
Critical Thinking and Acculturation," held at the University of Chicago. There 350 university faculty
members from across the country
were challenged to think of ourselves as citizens in disciplinary
communities, acculturated through
the process of advanced study and
work in professional circles, but
constantly interacting with citizens
of other cultures (i.e., colleagues in
other fields), with aliens who seek
settlement in our domains (i.e., students "majoring" in our fields), and
with other aliens who will tour our
domain briefly before settling elsewhere (i.e., students fulfilling requirements outside their majors). It
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is this last group that is probably
actively cultivated more by musicians than by others, for the field
of music needs its non-specialized
audience and base of support in
order to flourish.
At the Chicago institute, we were
urged to teach as if we were "above
the tracks," recognizing and following our disciplinary ways of knowing, but also hovering above these
traditional "tracks" in order to
maintain a perspective on the
world of knowledge at large, not
isolated forever on the tracks of
our own disciplines. We were reminded that what we sometimes
mistake for poor work on the part
of our students may be lack of acculturation to the customs and conventions of discourse in our field,
those things that we know but do
not explicitly teach.
This set of understandings-the
things we take for granted and
which we do not speak of-is apparently crucial to the definition of
professionals in our fields. Can
"musician" be so defined? What
makes a musician a musician? I do
not ask "what makes a musician become a musician?" I do not ask what
makes a good musician or an accomplished musician; I do not
make a distinction between musicians who have advanced professionally and those who still struggle
to achieve. Nor am I asking about
being "musical," that elusive quality
which makes the difference between a meaningful performance
and a perfunctory one. Rather, I
seek to identify the common assumptions of the community of
persons who are musicians. Are
there finally things that all musicians know?
This exercise may be predoomed to failure. Perhaps music
is not a discipline in the sense the
metaphor intends. Stephen Toulmin (in Human Understanding: The
Collective Use and Evolution of Concepts, Princeton, 1972), distinFebruary, 1987

guishes between fields that are "disciplinable" (i.e., whose concepts
lend themselves to disciplined debate and improvement) and those
that are not, the latter classified, by
Toulmin, as "compact, diffuse, or
would-be disciplines." Music, one of
Toulmin's spectrum of non-disciplinary activities, moves closer or
farther from disciplinary status depending on whether technical or
expressive, scientific or humanistic
aspects are being considered. In
common usage "musicians" include
composers, performers, critics, historians, and theorists. Further, the
term "musicians" encompasses both
amateurs and professionals, both
students and teachers, those involved in the music of high culture
and that of mass appeal.

A set of understandings-the things we simply
take for granted-is
apparently crucial to
the definition of
professionals in academe.
Even more troublesome is the
fact that musicians exist and function significantly in primitive and
non-Western cultures in ways unrelated to the concept of academic
knowledge commumues. Therefore, to bring my question into line
with the intention of the metaphor
of discipline as culture, I will use
"musician" here to mean those
who, in addition to a repertoire of
specialized information and skills,
know what counts as significant in
the field and what the terms of
evaluation are, know what can and
should be left unsaid in conducting
the work of the field as it functions
in Western culture as a discipline
or would-be discipline.
Introductory studies in music,
where one might think that the
things all musicians know should be

articulated clearly at the outset, are
usually known as "music appreciation" activities. (It is notable that
elementary studies in biology or
physics are not considered "science
appreciation.") Books to aid the
alien in the musical community
abound. Most of them are written
by musicians for the benefit of
those who want to be musicians or
who want to know some of the
things musicians know, and most of
them open with an essay alluding
to the mysterious "levels" of listenmg.
Aaron Copland, for example, describes the sensuous, expressive,
and musical planes of listening in
the introduction to his classic handbook, What to Listen for In Music.
Bennett Reimer, in a recent and
widely used college text, writes of
sensuous, perceptual, and creative
levels of listening; and Leonard
Meyer observes three modes of
musical signification:
formalist,
kinetic-syntactic, and referential.
In these and many other such
classifications employed in describing the process of musical appreciation, the point is made that "musicians" tend to listen one way and
laypersons in another. The intention of these introductions, in addition to urging more thought about
listening as a conscious process,
seems to be to urge laypersons to
try to listen like musicians do, but
what frequently follows in the rest
of the book may make it less likely
that they will or that they will want
to.
Many semesters of teaching
music appreciation have made me
reluctant to attack the sensuous, referential, and extra-musical modes
of listening to which most laypersons seem committed. Rather than
implore aliens to abandon their
current listening behaviors, I follow
the authors of the introductory
texts in suggesting that listening to
music may or may not involve an
abstractly "musical" frame of mind.
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For musicians it usually does.
Using Meyer's categories, I have
developed my own version of the
modes of listening construction: A
group of people are invited on a
boat trip. They spend the day circumnavigating a small island. One
group, the formalists, spend the
day consulting a map (the score),
constantly verifying the correspondence of the shoreline to the map
and calculating where, in relationship to the whole island, they are at
each point in time and space; a second group, the kinetic-syntactic
crowd, do not have a map nor do
they want one, but they pay excellent attention to each new view, to
each new sensation, on a momentto-moment basis. The third group,
the referentialists, spend most of
the day eating, drinking, and talking with one another, looking inward at each other rather than outward to the water and the shoreline.
When the trip is finished the referentialists are the first to exclaim,
"My goodness, I just love sailing!"
What they mean is that they had a
good time; the boat framed the
conditions for that good time, and
they will henceforth think of good
times when they think of boatrides.
The formalists leave the boat with
an idea of the island as a coherent
structure comprised of interrelated
parts, and they remember the map
better than they remember the experience of the boat ride. The
kinetic-syntactic travellers recall
vivid images and sensations, in
loose (but usually linear) relationship to each other.
The experience was meaningful
to each group. The travellers who
had moved from group to group
and had found different ways to
enjoy various parts of the day came
away with the widest range of
memones.
The story, which hardly needs
interpretation, suggests that any
mode of listening can become limit-

30

ing. Musicians listen in many
modes and so do non-musicians, although it is generally recognized
that the formalist mode requires
expertise usually found only in the
musically educated. I do suspect
that musicians at times listen to
music differently from others, but I
cannot say for sure. I do not believe that the "levels of listening"
schema, while useful for other
reasons, will explain how musicians
are distinctive as a knowledge community.

Musicians have taught
themselves to be
compelled by the activity
of tones. They don't have
to work to pay attention.
To make an admittedly tentative
beginning, there follows a list of assumptions I make that I take for
granted other musicians also take
as assumptions or first principles.
The first four points seem primary
and broadly applicable to music
within and without academic
knowledge communities; the remaining points are more specific to
music as it functions as a traditional
discipline. This list must not be
construed as a check list to see if,
perhaps, you too can be a musician,
nor is it a test for musicians to rate
their expertise. It merely represents an attempt to say what some
of the most essential ground rules
in my field of inquiry might be.
1. A piece of music has potential interest merely because it is a piece of
music. Musicians, by virtue of their
acculturation process, have taught
themselves to be compelled by the
activity of tones. They do not have
to remember to pay attention.
2. Listening to music is an active
and alert state, not a passive condition.
This principle generates the various explications of the levels of lis-

tening, urging novice listeners to
consider music as its own excellent
event which requires mental participation.
3. The value and meaning of a
sound is relative to its context. A "high
C" may be thrilling in a tenor aria
or annoying in the practice room
below my office; G-sharp is dissonant against D, but consonant with
E; that same G-sharp may serve as
a tonal goal (in a passage in the key
of G-sharp minor), or as the vehicle
of motion toward the goal (in a
passage in A minor, of which Gsharp is the "leading tone").
4. The chronological order in which
sounds and silences are arranged in a
piece of music must be observed if the
piece is to be the piece, but many variables are not controlled by this ordering.
Musical events in time, for example, are usually arranged with reference to a beat or pulse that is
established anew each time a piece
of music is performed. Although it
is usually recognized that the range
of acceptable tempo (rate of beat)
for a given piece is limited, it is
never absolute. Unless dealing with
electronic composition, musicians
work with long and short durations
as relative, not absolute, quantities;
divisions and multiples of the beat
can be manipulated without requiring that the beat occupy a specified
amount of clock time.
5. Acquisition of useful information
and the development of technical skills
is necessary, although the extent, the
kind, and the degree of the acquisitions and developments will vary
widely. Further, it must be noted
that the assumption of this set of
assumptions is that this point, the
cultivation of expertise, is a necessary but not sufficient condition.
6. Pieces of music cannot be expected
to convey specific narratives, pictures,
ideologies, or the biographies of their
makers, although pieces of music
may in varying degrees, both by
design and despite it, relate to
extra-musical content or the life exThe Cresset

perience of the maker.
7. Learning to "read music" is not
the goal of studying music, but a means
to it. Notation is a tool useful to the
performer, the composer, the listener, and the scholar for a variety
of reasons. Musical notation is not
music but it makes a great deal
more music possible and available,
and it makes it possible to think
more systematically about music
since the notated piece is rendered
into a static form which can be contemplated outside of musical time.
8. A piece of music has a shape and
structure which endures beyond the
note-to-note level of activity, and which
is more distinctive and specific than
what is usually meant by "mood."
This set of hypotheses probably
has many faults, but it can serve as
a starting point for thinking about
the knowledge that is at once essential and conventionally ignored
among acculturated citizens of the
community. To those outside that
community, these may even be new
and useful articulations, points
worth making.
Near the end of the film
Amadeus, Salieri sits at Mozart's
bedside transcribing the intentions
of the dying Mozart into a manuscript for the Requiem. Now Salieri,
both in historical fact and in the
fantasy of this story, already thinks
like a musician, already knows the
things musicians know. But in this
moment in the film he understands
for the first time what it feels like
to be inspired, what it might feel
like to be Mozart. For Salieri it is
not a lasting condition, this connection to the source, but that glimpse
and the knowledge it imparts
changes him forever.
If we can imagine what that instant of realization (to momentarily
"think like a musician" or like a
biologist or like a philosopher) can
mean for a novice, alien, or tourist
in our domains, wherever they are,
perhaps we can improve the
chances it will occur.
•1
February, 1987

A Gift from One Who Has Nothing
I climbed a hill today.
One, I am sure, I never climbed before.
But every slope and dip I took seemed to my mind
To bring me step by step to the Arizona village
Of my boy-years.
Some of the bushes on the hill seemed to know me.
One of the boulders was a winking face.
I knew before I reached its crest
What shape the character of the world would take.
At the top of the climb I saw the town
Way down the other side
And walked to meet it,
Silent as Joseph's heart in Bethlehem.
If I say that I knew this town when as a boy
I went to school there each day from our burdened farm,
I also need to say
That it knew not me
Except as a symbol seeking Reason,
Standing in the dust under the olive tree
Just outside the fence of the Mormon Church's lawn.
Yet now the buildings that I saw
Looked drab and worn,
Not red and white or burnt sienna
(As I think I remember them),
And waiting for me, like Berkeley's tree.
I passed the houses one by one,
Not supposing I should enter them,
But looking for the people who should,
According to their melancholy choices
Made alone in this astounding universe of places,
Be there.
Much later-somehow I know this-three humans
Turned a corner and approached me like an archetype.
Were they men or women?
In or out of body?
That they were native to that place,
I knew in a flash,
And understood the meaning in their hands
Reaching for a hand,
A gate, a door, and a cup.

Joe McClatchey
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Farewell,
Mr. Grant
Dot Nuechterlein
Cary Grant was almost exactly
the same age as my father. And
that is the extent of their resemblance.
Now don't take that as a slap at
my father. I love, respect, admire,
and enjoy spending time with Dear
old Dad. But for the life of me I
could never imagine Cary Grant as
Pop---not mine, not anybody's.
I have always been a conventional, fairly straight-laced sort of
person. I married at what was a relatively late age for my generation,
and by then a passable number of
men had passed through my life;
but there were never any scandalous affairs in my past, no really
shocking behavior. Likewise in the
years since I changed my name.
That's because I never ran into
Cary Grant. There is absolutely no
doubt in my mind that whether as
a teenager, a bride in her 20s, a
mother in her 30s, or a rapidly
aging matron in her 40s, if I had
ever entered the presence of that
man and he had so much as arched
an eyebrow in my direction, I
would have walked plumb off the
edge of the earth after him.
I can't recall exactly when I first
saw him, but it was certainly at a
tender age. My family didn't go to
movies much-there was the cost
factor, of course, not to mention
that most films were not considered
suitable for children. I saw most of
the Walt Disney classics and stuff
like Lassie, Come Home, but not
much else.
Except when I went to VISit
Grandma. Grandma lived in the
city, and she went to the pictures
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every week-on Dish Night. You
aren't familiar with that term,
perhaps? On Dish Night every person who entered the theater received a piece for a set of dishes. It
was a come-on, sort of like baseball
teams today giving away caps or
souvenir bats to everyone coming
through the turnstile to encourage
attendance.
As oldest daughter in the branch
of the family living farthest from
Grandma, I got to go spend a good
part of the summer with her during my childhood. I provided
another hand for the housekeeping, kept her company, and read
her mail to her. (Grandma traveled
quite a bit on Grandpa's railroad
pass and had crossed the ocean sev. era! times, so she had a healthy
streak of adventuresome independence and could hold her own in
most situations; but she had never
conquered the mysteries of written
English, and we grandkids helped
out when we were around.) But
without question my main function
was to supply another body for
Dish Night.
I loved it. It never mattered what
movie was playing: Tuesday night
(or maybe it was Wednesday) we
hurried through the supper dishes,
caught the streetcar, and settled
down in the picture palace for a
couple of hours of Movietone
News, a cartoon, coming attractions, and the main feature. It
could be a comedy, a romance, or
a shoot-'em-up-bang-bang western
or cop show-the little country
mouse who saw nothing during
fall/winter/spring got a large dose
of movies every summer.
The war shows and murder mysteries were not too thrilling; in fact,
I hardly saw them at all. Grandma
would nod off and not be of much
comfort during the scary parts, so I
would go sit in the ladies room for
what seemed an eternity. In those
days it was safe for kids to hang

around like that.
But the love stories were terrific,
and that's where Mr. Grant fits in.
He was already an established star,
naturally, and I remember when
my cousin gave me her old movie
magazines I would search them diligently for any gossip or snapshots
of him. But since he always played
basically the same part-the sophisticated,
glamorous,
charming,
gorgeous playboy-! simply cannot
recall the titles of the films I saw. I
only know, and am almost embarrassed to admit, that the very first
man I fell in love with was as old
as my father, back when I had one
mere digit in my age. And I never
really got over it.
My all-time favorite Cary Grant
movie was made when I was older.
It is An Affair to Remember, a tear
jerker with a happy ending, co-starring Deborah Kerr. You wouldn't
believe how often I have seen it!
And I cry every blessed time, too.
Has this irrational fantasizing
over an idealized, not-quite-true
dream man interfered with my real
life? Well, no, not really. I never
measured my boy friends (or my
men) against this image; I wasn't
dissatisfied with the flesh-and-blood
people I ran into, expecting them
to look or act like that celluloid
creature on the silver screen. Even
the man himself supposedly said
once that everyone would like to be
Cary Grant, including himself.
That persona is not to be confused
with reality.
But I am glad he existed, if only
mostly in our imaginations. He
helped me, for one, to experience
and eventually think about malefemale attraction, and what it
means to grow up and come to
terms with adult relationships. He
also added more than a touch of
grace and elegance to a world that
is too often crude and forlorn.
So, farewell, Mr. Grant. It was
very nice almost knowing you.

••
••
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